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I. INTRODUCTION
President Carter has characterized the need to establish a new
national plan for dealing with the energy problems of the 1970's and
1980's as "the moral equivalent of war."' The issue that has pre-
sented by far the greatest impediment to the establishment of a
national energy policy is the pricing of natural gas.' Natural gas
accounts for almost thirty percent of the annual energy consump-
tion in the United States.' Yet, as all participants in the natural gas
pricing debate agreed, the present method of setting natural gas
1. 13 WEEKLY CoMP. OF PRES. Doc. 561 (April 25, 1977).
2. The Natural Gas Act requires the Federal Power Commission (FPC) to regulate the
rates that producers of natural gas can charge for gas sold for resale in interstate commerce,
but it does not empower the FPC to regulate the rate that can be charged for gas sold in
intrastate commerce. 15 U.S.C. § § 717-717w (1976). See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin,
347 U.S. 672 (1954). The Department of Energy Organization Act transferred the FPC's power
to regulate producer rates to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in August
1977. Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 402, 91 Stat. 565 (1977) (to be codified in scattered sections of 15,
16, 42 U.S.C.).
On April 29, 1977, President Carter proposed the National Energy Act, which would have
extended FPC jurisdiction to the rates charged by producers for gas sold in intrasate com-
merce. See 207 ENERGY MNGM'T (CCH), No. 204, pt. 4 (May 4, 1977). On August 5, 1977, the
House of Representatives passed the National Energy Act by a vote of 244 to 177. H.R. 8444,
95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 8826-27 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1977). The provisions of the
Bill relating to natural gas pricing were almost identical to those contained in the Carter
Administration's bill. See 123 CONG. REc. 8309-13 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1977). An attempt to
amend the Administration's Bill through a substitute that would have eliminated federal
control over all producer sales of "new" gas was defeated in the House by a vote of 227 to
199. 123 CONG. REc. 8417 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1977). Thus, the Carter Administration and the
House of Representatives went on record in favor of extending federal control over producer
prices to the intrastate market.
On October 4, 1977, however, the Senate passed the Natural Gas Act Amendments of
1977 by a vote of 50 to 46. H.R. 5289, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 16,323-25 (daily
ed. Oct. 4, 1977). The Senate Bill rejected the approach taken by the Carter Administration
and the House, and eliminated all federal control over the rates that producers could charge
for "new" gas sold to either the intrastate or interstate markets. The House and Senate
conferees on the National Energy Act reached a compromise that will retain federal wellhead
rate regulation for the interstate market and extend federal regulation to the intrastate
market through January 1, 1985. See note 8 infra and accompanying text.
3. AMERICAN GAs AssOCIATION, LNG FAcr BOOK 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as LNG FAcT
BOOK].
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prices creates a market in which severe and protracted supply
shortages are inevitable.4 Since 1970 the serious imperfections in
the regulated gas market have been manifested visibly and pain-
fully in the form of shortages that have required adoption of curtail-
ment plans, complex administrative procedures that allocate scarce
gas supplies among competing consumers.5 The widespread un-
employment, economic dislocation, and near disastrous inability to
supply residences with gas for heating6 during the 1976-1977 winter
were only precursors of the conditions that could be expected in the
future if the present system of pricing natural gas were retained.
To date most of the debate on natural gas pricing has centered
around the issue of wellhead rate regulation; specifically, should
"new" gas supplies sold to the interstate market be deregulated, or
should federal rate regulation be extended to "new" gas sold to the
intrastate market. This issue has been continuously before Congress
in various forms for the past twenty-eight years. On at least three
occasions during this period-in 1950, 1955, and 1975-it has ap-
peared to be near resolution, but impasses between the House and
Senate or between the administrative and legislative branches
4. The jurisdictional dichotomy between gas sold in interstate commerce and gas sold
in intrastate commerce has produced a situation in which most gas producers have a choice
between selling newly discovered gas in the regulated interstate market or in the unregulated
intrastate market. As a result, only a small fraction of new gas reserves are dedicated to the
interstate market. Legislators supporting deregulation propose to eliminate this dichotomy
by deregulating the rates that producers can charge for newly discovered reserves sold to the
interstate market, while the opponents of deregulation would remove the dichotomy by ex-
tending federal regulation to the rates that producers charge for sales of newly discovered gas
sold to the intrastate market.
5. The term "curtailment" as used by the FPC and the FERC means the difference
between the amount of gas that an interstate pipeline is required by contract or certificate
to deliver and the amount it is actually able to deliver. The first curtailments occurred in
1970-71 and were only 0.1 trillion cubic feet (TCF), or about 0.7% of the total contractual
obligations of interstate pipelines. The amount of curtailment has increased steadily each
year since 1970, with the volumes curtailed in 1976-77 reaching 3.4 TCF, or about 23% of
pipelines' total contractual obligations. See S. HERMAN, R. PIERCE, M. TRoPIN, & B. TYREE,
NATURAL GAS USERS' HANDBOOK 3 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NATURAL GAS HANDBOOK]. See
generally FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, REQUIREMENTS, CURTAILMENTS, AND DELIVERIES OF IN-
TERSTATE PIPELINE COMPANIES BASED ON FORM 16 REPORTS REQUIRED TO BE FILED ON APRIL 30,
1977 (1977).
Curtailment plans consist of the provisions of each pipeline's tariff that govern the
manner in which the pipeline's curtailment, or inability to meet its contractual obligations,
is allocated among the pipeline's customers. See generally NATURAL GAS HANDBOOK, supra.
6. During the 1976-77 winter, gas curtailments forced the closing of 4000 manufacturing
plants, with over 1.2 million people temporarily unemployed as a result. In addition,
hundreds of schools were closed in several states, and over 100 fires were started in Philadel-
phia as people attempted to heat their homes without gas. SuBcoMm. OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, REPORT ON THE 95TH CONG., 1ST.
SESS., STATUS OF THE NATION'S PREPAREDNESS FOR THE WINTER OF 1977-78, at 4 (1977).
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of government have forestalled a resolution of the issue.7 The most
recent philosophical differences between the House and the Senate
over the issue of wellhead rate regulation finally were resolved by a
very complex compromise' associated with the Carter Administra-
tion's National Energy Act.' The compromise was passed by the
House and Senate"' as the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978."
During recent years, considerable controversy also has arisen
concerning the manner in which the costs of providing natural gas
service are apportioned among customers and consumers at the
wholesale (pipeline) and retail (distributor) levels. Debate over nat-
ural gas rate design has taken place in Federal Power Commission
7. In 1947 the Supreme Court held that sales of gas for resale in interstate commerce
by producers that are also interstate pipelines are subject to FPC rate regulation under the
Natural Gas Act. Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 331 U.S. 682 (1947). In 1950 Congress
passed a Bill specifically exempting sales by gas producers from FPC rate regulation, but the
bill was vetoed by President Truman. 1950 PUB. PAPERS 257-58 (1965). In 1954 the Supreme
Court held that sales for resale in interstate commerce by independent producers also are
subject to FPC rate regulation. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954). In
1955 Congress again passed a Bill exempting producer sales from FPC jurisdiction, but this
time the Bill was vetoed by President Eisenhower, 1956 Pus. PAPERS 256-57 (1958). In 1975
the Senate passed by a vote of 58 to 32 a Bill that would have removed FPC jurisdiction over
the prices that producers could charge for "new" gas. S. 2310, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CoNG.
REc. 33,655-59 (1975). The House, however, passed by a vote of 205 to 194 a Bill that extended
FPC jurisdiction to the rates that producers could charge for sales in intrastate commerce.
H.R. 9464, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. IEc. 778 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1976). The sharp
differences between the two bills presented no room for compromise in Conference, and no
legislation resulted. For the resolution of the differences between the House and the Senate
in the somewhat similar debates in the 1977-1978 session, see notes 8-11 infra and accompany-
ing text.
8. Under the compromise, federal wellhead rate regulation will be retained for the
interstate market and extended to the intrastate market through January 1, 1985. The regula-
tory scheme in effect during this period will be extraordinarily complex and difficult to
understand in detail. Approximately 19 different kinds of gas will exist during this period for
rate regulation purposes, and the maximum ceiling price at which gas can be sold will vary
widely depending upon such factors as: whether the gas is onshore or offshore, from a new or
old reservoir, from a new or old well, from a well shallower or deeper than 5000 feet, from a
well more or less than 21/2 miles from the nearest old well, from a property previously dedi-
cated to interstate or intrastate commerce under a contract that expires by its own terms,
and whether the gas is from conventional or "high cost" sources. Each combination of these
and other factors will trigger a different method of calculating the ceiling price at which the
gas will be sold between 1978 and 1985, and the ceiling price for each class of gas sold during
this period will increase annually by a percentage determined in accordance with a statutory
price escalation formula. After January 1, 1985, all "new" gas will no longer be subject to
federal rate regulation. Between July 1, 1985, and July 1, 1987, however, either Congress or
the President (subject to veto by both Houses of Congress) can reimpose price controls on
new gas for a maximum of 18 months without passing new legislation. After July 1, 1987,
wellhead rate regulation of "new" gas can be imposed only through new legislation.
9. The original act proposed by .the Carter Administration is reprinted in 207 ENERGY
MNGM'T (CCH) No. 204, pt. 4 (May 4, 1977).
10. 124 CONG. REc. 16,265 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1978); 124 CONG. REc. 13,426-27 (daily
ed. Oct. 14, 1978).
11. Pub. L. No. 95-621.
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(FPC) and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) pro-
ceedings,'" in Congress,' 3 and in some state utility commission pro-
ceedings." Unfortunately, however, the high intensity with which
these debates have been conducted has not been paralleled by com-
parable high quality analysis. The debate in the legislative and
regulatory forums has been conducted on a shallow and unfocused
plane, with little serious effort at systematic problem identification
and solution.'5 Futhermore, no attempt has been made to interrelate
the rate design issue with the wellhead pricing controversy. Yet, if
the goal is to achieve a more efficient allocation of scarce resources,
the overall scheme for regulating the natural gas industry ultimately
adopted must carefully interweave new wellhead pricing mecha-
nisms with new approaches to wholesale and retail rate design.
The theses of this Article are: (1) the present method of allocat-
ing natural gas costs among consumers produces significant alloca-
tive inefficiency that has contributed to the present problems in the
natural gas market and is certain to create even greater problems
in the future; (2) the new rate designs suggested over the past years
in regulatory and congressional debates would do little to eliminate
the allocative inefficiency inherent in present rate designs and
would introduce unnecessary collateral problems; (3) several ap-
proaches to the rate design issue potentially could eliminate or
12. See, e.g., Trunkline LNG Co., UTiL. L. ReP. (CCH) 11,970 (1977); Trunkline LNG
Co., UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 11,942 (1977); Columbia LNG Corp., UTn. L. REp. (CCH) 11,894
(1977); Columbia LNG Corp., 96 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 389 (1972); Columbia LNG Corp.,
95 Pus. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 145 (1972).
13. See H.R. 5289, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 29, 123 CONG. Rac. 16,323-25 (daily ed. Oct.
4, 1977); H.R. 8444, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 410, 123 CONG. REc. 8309-13 (daily ed. Aug. 2,
1977); S. 2310, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 28, 121 CONG. Rac. 33,655-59 (1975).
14. See, e.g., Southern Cal. Gas Co., Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n Dec. No. 85,627, 14 PUB.
U. REP. 4th (PUR) 498 (1976); OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION, ASPECTS OF PUBLIC
UTILrrY REGULATION 77-90 (June 1977).
15. There are a few recently published discussions of natural gas rate design issues that
are helpful, but each analysis is incomplete, and the conclusions are too tentative to provide
meaningful assistance to policymakers. In Aman and Howard, Natural Gas and Electric
Utility Rate Reform: Taxation Through Ratemaking?, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1085 (1977), the
authors convincingly critique some recent FPC efforts to change natural gas rate designs, but
they offer no alternative mechanism for dealing with the significant problems created by the
present rate designs. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION OFFICE OF ECONOMICS, INCREMENTAL PRICING
OF SUPPLEMENTAL GAS (1976) recognizes the problems created by present cost allocation meth-
ods, but it suggests only broadly the possible solution of inclining block rates, without ade-
quately discussing the problems inherent in such an approach. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION
TRANSMISSION, DISTRIBUTION AND STORAGE TECHNICAL ADVISORY TASK FORCE ON RATE DESIGN,
NATIONAL GAS SURVEY (1977) [hereinafter cited as RATE DESIGN] contains excellent passages
describing the problems created by the present methods of allocating costs and the theoretical
economic principles that should be used to adopt new pricing approaches. The report, how-
ever, comes to no conclusion, and the use of different authors to draft separate sections of
the report produces a format that is very difficult to follow.
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greatly reduce allocative inefficiency at a tolerable cost; and (4) the
economically preferable solution to the wellhead pricing problem
follows logically from the implementation of new methods of pricing
gas at the wholesale and retail levels.
I. THE PRESENT METHODS OF ALLOCATING NATURAL GAS COSTS
Most consumers at the retail level currently receive gas under
two rate forms-the declining block rate and the two-part rate. 6
The former, under which most residential and small commercial
consumers are served, provides a downward tapered rate in which
the first units of gas purchased by the consumer are sold at the
highest price, and the last units purchased, falling in what is re-
ferred to as the "tailblock," are sold at the lowest price. The second
prevalent retail rate form, the two-part rate under which many
industrial and large commercial consumers receive gas, yields an
analogous result.1 7 The two-part rate, however, bills the customer on
two bases-a demand charge based upon the amount of gas that the
customer is entitled to receive under its contract, and a commodity
charge based upon the amount of gas that the customer actually
received during the billing period. The single most common rate
form governing sales of gas on the wholesale level (sales from pipe-
lines to distributors) is the two-part demand-commodity rate. The
declining unit price characteristic of these rate forms is cost-based
if the cost-averaging accounting approach traditionally used in pub-
lic utility regulation is the frame of reference.
The costs that a pipeline or distributor must recover in its rates
in order to earn its allowed revenues can be classified conveniently
under four broad headings-customer costs, capacity costs, storage
costs, and energy costs. Customer costs consist of costs that can be
identified with specific classes of customers, such as billing and
metering. They tend to be significantly higher relative to gas usage
for small volume customers than for large volume customers.' Ca-
16. RATE DESIGN, supra note 15, ch. 2, at 2, 10. Two-part rates and declining block rates
are not the only rate forms in use today. Some pipelines and distributors use flat or volumetric
rates that assign a pro rata portion of all customer and capacity costs to each unit of gas
purchased. Id. at 4, 13. Flat rates based upon averaging of energy costs create the same
potential for misallocation of resources as two-part rates and declining block rates. The extent
of the misallocation of resources may be slightly less under the flat rate because the difference
between marginal cost and the price of the last unit of gas purchased by a customer under a
flat rate is likely to be slightly less than under a declining block or two-part rate.
17. Id. at 3, 10.
18. Customer costs are higher for small volume customers relative to the amount of gas
consumed simply because the gas supplier must use more resources in the process of billing
100 customers for 100 units of gas than in the process of billing one customer for 100 units of
gas.
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pacity costs consist principally of the fixed costs of operating the
system, such as the annual amortization of investment in pipes,
compressors, and valves. They also tend to be much higher in rela-
tion to total usage for small volume customers than for large volume
customers." Storage costs, as the name implies, are the costs of
storing gas in periods of slack demand for use in subsequent periods
in which demand exceeds supply. Energy costs consist principally
of the costs of acquiring the natural gas that the distributor or
pipeline resells. As recently modified by FPC rate cases, however,
the traditional Seaboard cost allocation method includes as much
as seventy-five percent of the capacity costs in the energy cost com-
ponent of the pipeline's rates.20
The two most common rate forms combine these four basic cost
components in the following manner. In the two-part rate, capacity
costs are recovered in part through the demand charge and in part
through the commodity charge. The proportion allocated to each
charge depends upon the particular Seaboard rate formula modifi-
cation in use at the time. The customer cost component of a two-
part rate typically is quite small because the administrative expen-
ses of serving a large volume customer are very low relative to the
volume of gas purchased. Customer costs usually are recovered
through the demand charge in a two-part rate. Energy costs, as
might be expected, are recovered in the commodity component of
the rate. Storage costs are recovered through various accounting
devices, ranging from a separate charge for each customer per unit
stored for the account of that customer, to inclusion of storage costs
19. The higher proportion of capacity costs included in the rates charged small volume
customers reflects that much more pipe is required for a distributor to deliver 100 units of
gas to 100 small customers than to deliver the same quantity of gas to a single large customer.
20. Economists have argued for a long time that capacity costs should be borne entirely
by those customers that require service during periods in which capacity is fully utilized. The
theory is that only those customers are responsible for the decision to invest in the assets that
comprise the system capacity costs. See, e.g., J. BONBRIGHT, PmRNCnrzs OF PUBLIC UwIrrY
RATgs 309-11 (1961); 1 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 89-103 (1970). The FPO
rejected this theory in part and required instead that half of the capacity costs be assigned
to the demand component and half to the commodity component. Atlantic Seaboard Corp.,
11 F.P.C. 43, 55 (1952). While this assignment of a portion of capacity costs to the commodity
charge is difficult to defend on the basis of economic theory, it may have produced a reasona-
bly acceptable rate structure largely because of the erroneous inclusion of some costs that vary
with volume in the calculation of capacity costs.
In 1973 the Commission modified the Seaboard formula by requiring allocation of 75%
of capacity costs to the commodity charge and 25% to the demand charge. United Gas Pipe
Line Co., 50 F.P.C. 1348 (1973), aff'd sub nom. Consolidated Gas Supply Corp. v. FPC, 520
F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The Commission questioned the applicability of the capacity
responsibility theory, which supports allocation of a high proportion of capacity costs to the
demand component when the gas shortage has produced a situation in which there is always
substantial excess capacity in the pipeline system.
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in the demand and commodity charges as part of system capacity
costs.
In the declining block rate, customer costs typically are re-
covered in the first one or two blocks of the rate form. Capacity costs
are recovered in most or all blocks, but commonly with a downward
taper so that the tailblock includes the lowest proportion of capacity
costs per unit consumed. Energy costs are recovered as a flat per
unit charge in all blocks. Similar to the two-part rate, storage costs
are recovered in various ways in the declining block rate. The most
common method of recovery seems to include most storage costs in
the capacity cost component, with aggregate capacity costs then
allocated to each consumption block.
Another characteristic of present natural gas rate forms de-
serves emphasis at the outset. Energy costs are calculated and billed
to each customer, and in each consumption block, on an average
cost, or "rolled-in," basis. If, for instance, a pipeline or distributor
purchases eighty-three percent of its gas supply at a cost of $0.80
per MCF 21 and the remaining seventeen percent of its gas supply at
a cost of $4.50 per MCF, the energy component of the rate charged
to each customer per unit purchased is approximately $1.43 per
MCF.2 2 This average cost method of recovering energy costs, com-
bined with the recovery of capacity costs and customer costs in the
separate demand charge component of a two-part rate or in the
initial consumption blocks of a declining block rate, explains why
the unit costs of purchasing gas decline for each customer as the
volume of gas purchased by that customer increases during the
billing period.
The costs of gas used in the above example reasonably repre-
sent the range of costs that confront interstate pipelines and distrib-
utors today. The average unit cost of gas paid by interstate pipelines
in 1976 was $0.58 per MCF.2 Gas flowing from wells drilled before
January 1, 1973, and sold under long-term contracts, is limited by
federal regulation to between $0.235 and $0.295 per MCF. Gas pro-
21. An MCF is 1000 cubic feet of natural gas at 14.73 pounds per square inch at
atmospheric pressure and sixty degrees fahrenheit. There are two commonly used methods
of measuring a unit of natural gas-volume in cubic feet and heat content in British Thermal
Units. Since the heat content of natural gas varies slightly from one supply to another, a
precise translation of the two measurements is not possible without knowing the heat content
of the specific supply. Because one MCF equals approximately one million British Thermal
Units (1 MMBTU), this method of converting BTU's to MCF has been used throughout the
Article to avoid the confusion engendered by using two different systems of measurement
depending upon the source of the data.
22. (.83 x $0.80) + (.17 x $4.50) = $1.429.
23. See FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION, MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW 72 (June 1977)
[hereinafter cited as MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW].
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duced from wells drilled before January 1, 1973, and sold under
"renewal" contracts, is limited to $0.52 per MCF. Gas produced
from wells commenced on or after January 1, 1973, but prior to
January 1, 1975, is limited to $0.93 per MCF, while gas produced
from wells commenced after January 1, 1975, can be sold for $1.42
per MCF. 4 The price of gas sold in the unregulated intrastate mar-
ket ranges generally from $1.50 to $2.00 per MCF.2 Relatively little
gas from so-called "nontraditional" sources flowed in 1976, but the
cost of these supplies indicates the wide range of prices at which gas
is potentially available at the present. For instance, liquified natu-
ral gas (LNG) imported from Algeria is estimated to cost $5.57 per
MCF;2' synthetic gas (SNG) manufactured from petroleum prod-
ucts or coal costs between $4.00 and $5.00 per MCF;2 and Alaskan
gas transported from Prudhoe Bay is estimated to cost between
$3.30 and $3.90 per MCF upon delivery to the lower forty-eight
states.2 Under any approach to the regulation of natural gas prices
that conceivably could emerge from the political process in the near
future, gas costs to pipelines ranging from $0.23 per MCF to over
$5.00 per MCF will continue. The debate over the regulation of
wellhead prices is confined to the issue whether sales of "new" gas
produced from traditional sources should be deregulated or continue
to be subject to federal rate regulation. Permitting rates on old gas
to rise to market-clearing levels has received no serious considera-
tion; consequently, over the next few decades a large but decreasing
proportion of the total supply of gas flowing in interstate pipelines
and distribution systems will be priced between $0.23 and $0.52 per
MCF, while new supplies will be available at prices ranging from
$1.75 to well over $5.00 per MCF.
Ill. FUNCrIONAL EFFECT OF PRESENT RATE DESIGNS
Focusing for the moment solely upon the flat, average cost en-
ergy component of today's rate forms,29 a simple example demon-
24. See American Pub. Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 567 F.2d 1016, 1025, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
25. MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW, supra note 23, at 73.
26. Tenneco Atlantic Pipeline Co., FPC No. CP 77-100 (Nov. 2, 1977) (initial decision).
27. Transwestern Coal Gasification Co., UTiL. L. REP. (CCH) 11,669 (1975); RATE
DESIGN, supra note 15, ch. 6, at 5.
28. RATE DEsIGN, supra note 15, ch. 6, at 4.
29. As discussed in Part V(A) infra, an analysis of present rate forms cannot focus
exclusively upon the energy cost component, but must consider as well the treatment of
capacity costs, customer costs, and storage costs. Theoretically, it is possible for the inclusion
of the sunk costs associated with the transportation and distribution of gas in the average
unit cost calculation to offset the understatement of the energy cost component that results
from the averaging process, yielding a unit rate that does not understate the resource cost of
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strates that significant societal costs, reflected by inefficient re-
source allocation, are inherent in the present rate structure. If Dis-
tributor A is purchasing 100,000 MCF of old gas under long-term
contracts subject to federal rate regulation at a unit cost of $0.80 per
MCF, because of the much higher cost of other fuels, its customers
undoubtedly will demand more gas than the distributor has avail-
able." In order to meet this excess demand, the distributor may
purchase 20,000 MCF of additional gas supplies in the form of liqui-
fied natural gas (LNG) imported from Algeria at a cost of $4.50 per
MCF. From the distributor's vantage point, given the present rate
design, the transaction is clearly economic because the rate result-
ing from averaging the new expensive gas supply with the old inex-
pensive supply is approximately $1.43 per MCF-a rate so low in
relation to other sources of energy that the distributor's customers
undoubtedly will continue to demand far more gas than the distrib-
utor can supply at this rate.
Is the transaction economic from society's standpoint? Is it
economically rational from an overall resource allocation perspec-
tive for Distributor A to purchase 20,000 MCF of imported LNG at
$4.50 per MCF in the circumstances described? Given today's meth-
ods of pricing natural gas, short of the virtually impossible task of
constructing long-term demand curves for each of Distributor A's
customers, no answers exist to these questions. Would Distributor
A's customers choose to increase their consumption of gas by one-
fifth if they were confronted with a price of $4.50 per MCF for the
natural gas. Whether such a situation exists in a particular gas distribution system could be
determined only through a detailed analysis of that system's costs and rates.
Focusing upon the energy component alone for purposes of determining the functional
effect of the rate structure, however, will produce an accurate result in almost all cases for
two reasons. First, to the extent that sunk costs are included in present unit rates, the effect
of their inclusion on consumer behavior is minimized under either the declining block or two-
part rate form because the cost of the last units of gas purchased by the consumer under either
rate form includes the lowest proportion of sunk costs. Second, the prices that pipelines or
distributors must pay today for additional units of gas are so high relative to the average cost
of all gas flowing in a pipeline or distribution system that the vast majority of gas distributors'
rates are certain to understate the costs of providing an additional unit of gas, even after
adjusting the unit rate for the inclusion of sunk costs. For instance, the national average rate
for gas in the first quarter of 1976 was $1.80 per MCF for residential consumers and $1.25
per MCF for industrial consumers. AMERICAN GAS ASSOCIATION, AGA QUARTERLY (First
Quarter 1976). Starting with this base rate, a very significant increment of LNG or SNG could
be purchased at a cost of $4.00 or $5.00 per MCF without increasing the cost of gas to the
consumer to the point at which it equals or exceeds the actual cost of providing an additional
unit of natural gas.
30. For instance, the cost of Number 2 fuel oil during January 1976 ranged from $2.81
to $2.99 per MCF equivalent for residential consumers and from $1.90 to $2.30 per MCF
equivalent for industrial consumers. FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION, MONTHLY ENERGY
REvIEW 66-68 (April 1977).
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last units they consume? If they would, they value gas at a price
higher than the cost of the supply purchased by Distributor A, and
Distributor A's decision to purchase the full increment of LNG max-
imizes consumer satisfaction and thus efficiently allocates re-
sources. If Distributor A's customers would choose to forego the
purchase and consumption of the last 20,000 MCF of gas available
when forced to pay its full cost of $4.50 per MCF, then Distributor
A's purchase on their behalf results in an inefficient allocation of
resources. The consumers could maximize their satisfaction by plac-
ing the $90,000 spent by Distributor A to provide them with an
additional 20,000 MCF of gas into the purchase of goods and serv-
ices that they do value at a price in excess of the cost of making
those goods available.
A response might be that consumers may value gas at the mar-
gin at greater than $4.50 per MCF. If that is the case, assuming that
no less expensive source of supply is available, no misallocation of
resources results from the hypothetical transaction described. While
such an observation may be accurate with respect to this example,
the potential for resource misallocation is always present in the
current rate design because of the sharp disparity between the price
of gas supplied under old contracts and the price at which new gas
can be purchased. For instance, if Distributor A believed that its
customers would continue to buy 120,000 MCF of gas at a unit price
of $4.50 per MCF, it would be willing to pay up to $23 per MCF for
the 20,000 MCF required to bring its total supply from 100,000 MCF
to 120,000 MCF.3 ' This purchase, however, would cost Distributor
A's customers $370,000 in lost consumer satisfaction. 2
The present system of allocating energy costs produces a cross-
subsidization of new gas supply increments by using the gains from
government regulation of the price of old gas. To the extent that we
have chosen to limit the economic rent that producers can obtain
for old gas produced at inframarginal costs,3 3 the present system of
31. (100,000 MCF X $0.80 per MCF) + (20,000 MCF X $23 per MCF) = $540,000.
$540,000 + 120,000 MCF = $4.50 per MCF.
32. If consumers are willing to pay only $4.50 per MCF for additional units of gas, they
can maximize their satisfaction by purchasing other commodities once the cost of gas exceeds
$4.50 per MCF. By effectively forcing consumers to pay $23 per MCF for additional units of
gas, the cost averaging feature of the natural gas rate structure costs consumers, in terms of
lost satisfaction, $23 minus $4.50, or $18.50, for each MCF of gas purchased by the distributor
in excess of the 100,000 MCF it originally had available. $18.50 per MCF X 20,000 MCF
- $370,000.
33. Retaining price controls on old gas is a method of precluding producers from obtain-
ing excessive economic rent or windfall profits on the sale of gas that can be produced at a
cost substantially below the present marginal cost of producing gas. The potential for earning
excessive rents from selling inframarginal cost production at prices based upon industry
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wholesale and retail rate design potentially removes the entire con-
sumer gain from consumers and transfers it to producers of new gas
in the form of a subsidy for new gas supplies.34 If pipelines and
distributors respond rationally to the economic signals given to
them by present rate designs, they will "spend" the entire gains
from the regulation of old gas on new gas supplies, and many eco-
nomically irrational projects will be undertaken.
The Council on Wage and Price Stability has estimated the
magnitude of the annual subsidy made available by present rate
designs to be $15 billion.3 5 This approximation was derived by mul-
tiplying the quantity of old gas subject to federal rent control times
the difference between the average unit cost of this gas and the
estimated unit price that would clear the market for gas. In 1976
interstate pipelines purchased and resold eleven trillion cubic feet
of natural gas, paying producers an average price of $0.58 per MCF.
Using the relatively conservative figure of $2.00 per MCF as an
estimate of the price at which the gas market would clear, the poten-
tial gain to consumers resulting from the decision to control produ-
cer rents from old inframarginal gas production is over $15 billion
per year. 6 The present average-cost method of allocating commod-
marginal cost exists to some extent in any industry and is generally tolerated as a reward to
the firm with access to the most valuable factors of production, in this case large gas reservoirs
discovered years ago. The potential for producers of old gas to earn excessive rents, however,
is particularly high because of the extreme increase that has been experienced over the last
decade in the industry marginal cost of producing gas. Thus, even if the gas production
industry were structurally and behaviorally competitive, a good case could be made for
retaining price controls on old gas as a method of limiting the rent that producers could
otherwise obtain by selling old gas at prices based upon today's higher industry marginal cost.
See S. BREYER & P. MAcAvoy, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL POWER COMMSSION 64-66
(1974).
34. Of course, domestic producers of gas cannot obtain any of the potential benefits of
this subsidy under the present regulatory scheme because the prices they are allowed to
charge are determined by the Federal Power Commission (now Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission) using a nationwide cost-of-service calculation. The potential recipients of the
subsidy today are foreign gas producers, principally in Canada, Mexico, and Algeria, whose
rates are not subject to United States price controls, and producers of coal and other unregu-
lated feedstocks that can be used to manufacture synthetic gas.
35. ECONOMIC REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, WRITTEN
COMMENTS OF THE COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STAmBILrrY ON El Paso Eastern Company (May
8, 1978) (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
36. ($2.00 per MCF - $0.58 per MCF) x 11,000,000,000 MCF = $15,620,000,000.
The method of calculation is flawed, but the result is a reasonably good approximation
of the total subsidy potentially available. The formula used to calculate the amount of the
subsidy should take into account the sunk costs of transportation and distribution that are
included in the rates now charged for natural gas. See Part V(A) infra. Thus, the formula
should be [(market clearing price of gas - present unit cost of gas paid by pipelines) x volumes
of gas being delivered] - aggregate annual amount of sunk costs included in present gas rates
= total annual subsidy potentially available.
The aggregate annual amount of sunk costs included in natural gas rates can be approxi-
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ity costs makes this entire $15 billion potentially available to subsi-
dize uneconomic and irrational gas supply projects."7 The exact
amount of the subsidy made available by present rate design, of
course, will vary directly with the market clearing price of gas and
the quantity of old gas that continues to be available at inframar-
ginal prices. Assuming that rent controls on new gas production are
eliminated, the subsidy probably would cease to exist in the early
twenty-first century, when the volume of old gas entering pipelines
under long-term dedications subject to price control approaches
zero. In the meantime, however, many economically irrational gas
supply projects will be undertaken, resulting in substantial misallo-
cation of resources, reducing total consumer satisfaction, and pro-
ducing unnecessary inflationary pressures. Indeed, the amount of
the subsidy available may increase over the next few years as the
market clearing price of gas increases at a sharper rate than the rate
of decline in the volumes of old gas flowing through the interstate
pipeline network.
The resource misallocation potentially resulting from present
rate designs will be reflected in consumption levels and in consump-
tion patterns, as well as in irrational investment decisions. Each
consumer values his last unit of gas consumption slightly lower than
the preceding unit. The consumer can be expected to place the least
value on the last unit of gas received (the marginal unit of consump-
tion) because the marginal unit of consumption typically is the least
expensive to forego. By pricing the marginal unit of consumption
substantially below the cost of obtaining additional units of gas, the
present rate design results in overconsumption of natural gas. For
instance, assume that Distributor A has a customer who can forego
mated by multiplying the annual depreciation rate allowed for rate-making purposes, 4.6%,
see Texas Gas Transmission Corp., UTL. L. REP. (CCH) $ 11,971 (1977), times the total
investment of United States gas pipelines and distributors in transmission and distribution
facilities, approximately $50 billion, see AMERICAN GAS ASSOCIATION, FUTURE FOR GAS ENERGY
IN THE UNITED STATES (1977). The calculation then becomes [($2.00 per MCF - $0.58 per
MCF) x 11,000,000,000 MCF] - (0.046 x $50,000,000,000) = $13,320,000,000. Of course, the
amount of the available subsidy varies directly with the market clearing price of gas. If you
assume, as many gas pipelines apparently do, that gas is marketable at a price of $4.50 per
MCF, the amount of the available subsidy is over $40 billion annually.
37. It is unlikely that the entire amount of the subsidy potentially available actually
would be spent by pipelines and distributors because this would require the timely approval
by federal and state regulatory authorities of every new gas supply project proposed by gas
pipelines and distributors. Since the federal and state regulatory authorities have no mean-
ingful yardstick available to determine the economic desirability of each gas supply project
and the present acute shortage of gas imposes considerable pressure on regulators to approve
proposed gas supply projects, it is fair to assume, however, that a substantial portion of the
potentially available subsidy will be spent through the approval of economically irrational
gas supply projects.
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consuming one MCF of gas at the margin by investing the equiva-
lent of $2.00 per MCF in additional insulation. The marginal unit
of gas costs Distributor A $4.50 per MCF, but the customer receiving
gas under a declining block rate can obtain the last unit of gas in
the tailblock of his rate form at a price approaching Distributor A's
average energy cost of approximately $1.43 per MCF.3 5 Faced with
the true cost of consuming the last unit, the customer would forego
consumption and install insulation. The present rate design masks
the costs of the marginal unit of consumption, causing the customer
to purchase the last unit of gas rather than to install insulation-an
economically irrational choice from the standpoint of a proper allo-
cation of society's resources and maximization of consumer satisfac-
tion, but a perfectly rational decision on the part of the individual
customer given the inaccurate pricing signals provided by the pres-
ent rate design. The total amount of excess consumption that is
likely to result from this understating of costs is difficult to quan-
tify, but the wide disparity between the marginal cost of additional
increments of gas supply and the price based upon average cost that
each consumer pays for the marginal unit of consumption39 suggests
that the amount of excess consumption resulting from average cost
pricing is substantial, even if demand for gas is relatively inelastic.
Suboptimal allocation of resources also emerges as an indirect
result of present wholesale and retail rate designs. The price of a
substantial portion of the total supply of gas sold at the wellhead is
controlled at inframarginal prices. These inframarginal prices are
averaged in with the higher prices of new supplies, producing a cost
of gas to consumers that causes demand to exceed supply." To
return to the original example, at the $1.43 per MCF energy cost,
resulting from the combination of 100,000 MCF of old gas at $0.80
38. The price at which Distributor A sells gas will exceed the distributor's average
energy cost to the extent that capacity, storage, and customer costs are included in the rate
applicable to the tailblock of the rate form. Of course, to the extent these costs are avoidable,
they are included properly as part of the marginal cost of providing gas service.
39. As discussed in the text accompanying notes 26-28 supra, additional units of gas
can cost a pipeline or distributor $5.00 or more per MCF. Adding the avoidable costs incurred
in transporting that unit of gas to the consumer, the marginal cost of gas may exceed $6.00
per MCF. Yet, the average price paid by consumers is only $1.80 per MCF for residential
consumers and $1.25 per MCF for industrial consumers. AMERICAN GAS AssocIATioN, AGA
QUARTERLY (First Quarter 1976).
40. It is theoretically possible for the gas market to clear even with averaging of energy
costs. This, however, could occur only if pipelines and distributors actually spend the total
annual subsidy of approximately $15 billion on economically irrational gas supply projects.
As discussed in note 37 supra, this is not likely to happen. The cost of permitting the gas
market to clear automatically while retaining the present method of determining retail and
wholesale rates would be an enormous waste of resources and/or redistribution of wealth from
United States consumers to foreign producers.
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per MCF and 20,000 MCF of new LNG at $4.50 per MCF, Distribu-
tor A's customers will demand far in excess of 120,000 MCF of gas.
Because the controlled price cannot perform the market-clearing
and allocation function, an administrative method of allocating gas
among competing customers is necessary. The curtailment mecha-
nism employed by the FPC4' undoubtedly produces an imperfect
allocation of scarce gas supplies.
In a laudable effort to replicate the allocation of gas supplies
that would exist given free market pricing, the FPC has based cur-
tailments (or allocation of the gas supply shortfall) principally upon
the end use to which the gas is ultimately put. Such uses as large
volume boilers, which are determined administratively to be subject
to a relatively elastic demand curve because the uses can be con-
verted to alternate fuels at a relatively low cost per unit of gas
displaced, are the first to lose access to gas when demand exceeds
supply." Uses that are determined to have relatively inelastic de-
mand curves because they are much more expensive to convert to
alternate fuels, such as residential, industrial process, and feedstock
uses, receive higher curtailment priorities and are allowed access to
gas during periods in which gas is unavailable to the lower priority
uses.
Notwithstanding its conscious effort to maximize allocative ef-
ficiencies by using administrative mechanisms for allocating gas
supplies, the FPC's curtailment rules can only crudely approximate
free market results. For instance, all residential uses of gas are
placed in the highest curtailment priority because the economic cost
of converting a home furnace from gas to an alternate fuel is very
high. The market, however, would impose some portion of the gas
41. Curtailment refers to the reduction of the quantity of gas that a pipeline or distribu-
tor must supply each of its customers below the quantity that the pipeline or distributor is
required by contract to provide the customer. The FPC's authority to permit such curtail-
ments was made clear in FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621 (1972). See
generally NATURAL GAS HANDBOOK, supra note 5. See also Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. FPC,
517 F.2d 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Louisiana v. FPC, 503 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1974); American
Smelting & Refining Co. v. FPC, 494 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The FPC's authority to permit
curtailment of gas service was transferred in part to the Department of Energy and in part
to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in the Department of Energy Organization
Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, §§ 301(a), 402(a)(1)(E), 91 Stat. 565 (1977).
42. The precise curtailment priorities vary from pipeline to pipeline, but the general
scheme that has emerged in litigated curtailment proceedings places residential and small
commercial requirements in the first priority, industrial process, plant protection, and feed-
stock requirements in the second priority, and large volume boiler fuel requirements in the
lowest priority, with a residual priority containing all other requirements immediately above
the priority containing large volume boiler fuel requirements. See, e.g., Cities Serv. Gas Co.,
UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 11,957 (1977); Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., UTIL. L. REP.
(CCH) 11,865 (1976); Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) % 11,779 (1976).
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supply shortfall on residential uses because of the myriad actions
short of conversion, such as the elimination of pilot lights and the
installation of weather stripping, that the residential user can take
at relatively low cost to reduce the amount of gas consumed. More-
over, classifying end uses according to degrees of demand elasticity
is an overwhelmingly difficult task to accomplish in an administra-
tive proceeding. Only broad classes of uses, such as process uses and
nonprocess uses, can be distinguished. 3 The classifications cannot
accurately reflect differences among the numerous types of combus-
tion units. 4 Errors in classification are certain to occur and are
unlikely to be corrected. 45 Changes in elasticity reflecting rapidly
changing combustion technology may not be reflected in changed
allocation priorities and reclassification of uses for decades." Thus,
43. All the end-use curtailment plans approved to date place industrial process uses in
a priority superior to nonprocess industrial uses. The FPC defines a process use as "gas use
for which alternate fuels are not technically feasible such as in applications requiring precise
temperature controls and precise flame characteristics." 18 C.F.R. § 2.78(c)(8) (1977). The
Commission has given little guidance on the meaning of this definition, but the phrase
"technically feasible" necessarily must be tempered by economic considerations. Obviously,
another fuel can replace natural gas for any use if the cost of replacing combustion equipment
is ignored.
44. The cost of converting a combustion process from natural gas to an alternate fuel
varies substantially depending upon the design and function of the combustion equipment.
The cost of conversion per unit of natural gas displaced lies along a wide spectrum, yet each
industrial and commercial use must be classified as process or nonprocess. Thus, the process
and nonprocess priorities each necessarily include uses with widely varying costs of conver-
sion. See generally J. JENSEN & T. STAUFFER, IMPLICATIONS OF NATURAL GAS CONSUMPTION
PATTERNS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF END-USE PRIORITY PROGRAMS (1971).
45. Because of the large number and wide variety of uses served by each pipeline,
classification of uses through an adjudicatory fact-finding process is virtually impossible.
Typically, the initial classification is made by the consumer, and a data committee consisting
of representatives of selective pipeline distributor customers reviews the initial classification.
See NATURAL GAS HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 20-23. The potential for both inadvertent and
intentional misapplication of the Commission's ambiguous definitions of end-use classifica-
tions is great.
46. Because of the gas shortage, combustion equipment manufacturers have had strong
incentives to develop new methods of converting gas combustion equipment to other fuels
during the last few years. As a result, many uses of gas that were properly classified as process
uses in response to a questionnaire circulated in a pipeline curtailment case four or five years
ago can now be converted to an alternate fuel at a relatively low cost. To reflect the availabil-
ity of advances in combustion equipment conversion technology in the classification of end
uses for purposes of implementing pipeline curtailment plans, however, would require an
entirely new data collection effort. Moreover, some means of determining the accuracy of the
new end-use data would have to be found. It may be reasonable to assume that most consum-
ers reported their end uses as accurately as they could in response to the original question-
naires, since most consumers did not know the purpose for which the data was to be used.
To make such an assumption about end-use data gathered today, long after gas consumers
have learned that the classification of their end-uses in one priority or another can determine
whether they will continue to receive cheap gas or be forced to substitute with more expensive
fuels would be naive in the extreme. The potential for self-serving misclassifications because
of a new effort to collect revised end-use data under today's conditions is extreme. In three
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the resource misallocation that indirectly results from the need to
substitute crude administrative allocation schemes for market price
in performing the allocative function, although not precisely quanti-
fiable, is undoubtedly substantial. Essentially, some consumers who
value gas at a price greater than its replacement cost cannot obtain
gas at all, while other consumers who value gas at a price less than
its replacement cost are given the opportunity to purchase gas at
prices substantially below its replacement cost.
The present method of averaging energy costs also raises signifi-
cantly the transaction costs inherent in regulating the natural gas
industry. First, the curtailment scheme that replaces the market-
place as the allocator of gas supplies has very high administrative
costs. Hundreds of lawyers and expert witnesses sit in FPC hearing
rooms for years debating which uses on a particular pipeline system
are entitled to high curtailment priorities." The major curtailment
cases have been in constant litigation for five to eight years, and
there is no reason to expect that the end is in sight for most cases.
Indeed, since elasticities of demand change constantly with chang-
ing technology, there is no reason to expect that any administrative
proceeding to allocate natural gas based upon differential elastici-
ties of demand would ever end. Second, the present rate designs
necessitate lengthy proceedings to determine administratively
whether a proposed new gas supply project should be authorized.
For instance, the first proceeding in which an interstate pipeline
requested FPC permission to import large volumes of LNG required
seven years of litigation to complete.4 Because of the externalities
recent FERC proceedings, the Commission staff has presented testimony contending that
many of the end uses initially classified as process uses on the pipeline systems at issue in
those proceedings can now be converted to alternate fuels. Such contentions were presented
by George D. Dornbush in Southern Natural Gas Co., No. RP 76-147; Northern Natural Gas
Co., No. RP 76-52; and El Paso Natural Gas Corp., No. RP 72-6. All three cases are still in
litigation and are unlikely to be concluded on a final basis for many years.
47. For instance, the curtailment proceeding initiated on the United Gas Pipeline Com-
pany system in 1970 as a result of the gas shortage is still in Phase II of what is scheduled to
be a five phase proceeding. See Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Reg. Comm'n,
565 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1977). See also FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621
(1972). The curtailment proceeding initiated on the Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. sys-
tem in 1971 was just remanded by a court of appeals for further hearings. See Elizabethtown
Gas Co. v. FPC, 562 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In both cases and in the multitude of other
curtailment proceedings, the parties represented by counsel include most direct customers
of the pipeline and many of the large gas consumers who receive gas indirectly from the
pipeline through one or more distribution companies. The records typically consist of tens of
thousands of pages of testimony.
48. The original application was filed September 22, 1970, and the order approving the
project was issued January 21, 1977. See Columbia LNG Corp., UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 11,894
(1977). Both the natural gas industry and the Comptroller General have been critical of the
lengthy and costly regulatory procedures for determining whether a gas supply project should
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inherent in major new gas supply projects, some form of administra-
tive approval process will remain necessary no matter how the gas
resulting from the project is priced. Reducing the time required to
process applications for new gas supply projects and reducing the
transaction costs of processing such applications, however, will be
very difficult as long as the agency, consistent with its mandate to
protect the public interest,49 must attempt to determine whether the
project is economically rational when measured by the criteria ordi-
narily supplied automatically by the market for the output of the
project.
Since the present method of averaging the cost of new gas with
old gas precludes a meaningful market test of economic rationality,
the certifying agency can do its job adequately only if, before it
begins the process of evaluating externalities, it attempts to deter-
mine whether the gas resulting from the proposed project would be
marketable under a hypothetical rate design that reflects the full
cost of the gas supply. This is an awesome task to accomplish ad-
ministratively; it requires an approximation of the aggregate long-
term supply and demand curves for natural gas.5 ° The FPC did not
be approved, analogizing the situation to the delay inherent in the nuclear licensing process.
COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO CONGRESS: THE NEW NATIONAL LIQUIFIED NATURAL GAS
IMPORT PoIicY REQUIRES FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS 14-15 (Dec. 12, 1977); see LNG FACT BOOK,
supra note 3, at 30-31.
49. The responsibility of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in reviewing an
application for a new gas supply project is to approve the project if it finds that the project
is "required by the present or future public convenience and necessity." 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e)
(1976). In other words, the Commission is asked to determine the societal costs and benefits
of the project and to approve only those projects whose benefits to society outweigh their
costs. To the extent that the societal costs and benefits of a project are internal and con-
fronted by the party proposing the project, the Commission can rely upon the self-interest of
those parties to refrain from proposing projects that are not economically beneficial to society.
There are two reasons why some form of administrative determination of public convenience
and necessity is required at present: (1) not all of the societal costs and benefits of a project
are internalized; and (2) the rate structure under which pipelines and distributors sell gas
distorts the costs and benefits of the project as perceived by its sponsor. The second problem
can be eliminated by modifying the rate structure. The first will remain although air pollution
regulations, safety regulations, and changes in the principles of tort law have reduced the
magnitude of residual uninternalized societal costs in recent years. With a change of rate
structure that forces pipelines and distributors to confront a market test of the economic
viability of each project, the Commission could quite legitimately refuse to set any issue
associated with a proposed gas supply project for hearing unless it involved an allegation of
significant uninternalized societal costs, such as environmental degradation that the com-
pany cannot be forced to avoid by administrative regulations and cannot be forced to pay
for adequately through tort law.
50. It is possible to design a computer model that would measure the economic costs
and benefits of a gas supply project. Both the Federal Power Commission staff and the
Department of Interior presented the results of such computer models in the form of calcula-
tions of net national economic benefits in El Paso Alas. Co., FPC No. CP 75-96, the proceed-
ing that resulted in the approval of a gas pipeline to transport Prudhoe Bay gas to the lower
[Vol.31:1089
NATURAL GAS RATE DESIGN
even attempt such an undertaking in the seven years in which the
initial major LNG import application was being processed. If the
method of allocating costs in the natural gas industry were modified
in a manner that permitted a market test of new gas supply projects,
the FPC's successors-in-interest, the Department of Energy and the
FERC, could focus exclusively upon externalities in the project ap-
plication review process, thereby permitting a substantial reduction
in the amount of time and resources spent in the review of applica-
tions for new gas supply projects.
The average cost rate designs now in use generate at least one
other significant societal cost. The relative bargaining strengths of
the initial supplier of gas5' and the pipeline or distributor purchas-
ing gas for resale are seriously distorted. To illustrate the way in
which average cost pricing distorts bargaining strengths, a simple
hypothetical may be helpful. Suppose that a producer has a new gas
supply potentially available for sale to a pipeline or distributor.
Assume that the marginal cost of this supply to the producer, in-
cluding cost of capital, is $2.00 per MCF. We know that the produ-
cer's marginal cost will form the basis for the unstated floor in the
price negotiations between the producer and potential pipeline or
distributor purchasers, but what incentive do pipelines and distrib-
utors have to bargain hard enough to bring the producer's price as
close as possible to marginal cost?
The extent to which a regulated utility has incentive to shop
and bargain for the lowest available price on its purchases has been
a question for some time and has been particularly troublesome
when, in order to achieve utility earnings stability, the purchase
price of the commodity automatically is included in the utility's
48 states. A model of this variety requires calculation of the cost to consumers of the gas
resulting from construction of the project and estimation of the demand for gas during the
life of the project.
The economic model approach, however, has severe limitations. First, much of the time
of highly trained agency personnel is required to construct the model and to determine the
appropriate input data. Second, the reliability of the output of the model depends critically
upon the accuracy of input data, such as long-term elasticity of demand for natural gas, that
cannot be verified. As a result, there is a natural tendency for an agency charged principally
with alleviating the gas shortage to select input data that will show societal benefits exceeding
societal costs for all projects except those that it already has decided to reject on other
grounds. It is much less likely that a company confronted with a decision to begin a project
under conditions in which all of the potential costs and benefits of the project are internalized
would engage in such self-deception. This may reflect a cynical attitude toward the regulatory
process, but it is a cynicism resulting from years of observing expert witnesses respond to the
perceived desires of their clients (whether private or public) to obtain a predetermined result.
51. From the pipeline's perspective, the initial supplier of gas may be a domestic produ-
cer, a foreign producer, a foreign government marketing agency, or a supplier of feedstock
for a synthetic gas plant.
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rates through devices such as purchased gas adjustment clauses.!"
When the incentive to bargain inherent in regulatory lag is removed
by the purchased gas adjustment clauses, the only remaining source
of bargaining incentive to the regulated pipeline or distributor is the
elasticity of demand for its product. 3 If the pipeline is concerned
that paying a high price for a new gas supply will increase the risk
that it will be unable to sell all of the gas it is committed to pur-
chase, the pipeline has a strong incentive to shop and bargain for
the lowest price it can get. With this incentive present, the prices
that producers can obtain for new gas supplies eventually should
equal the long-run marginal cost of production. Although some
producers may continue to earn windfall profits in the form of exces-
sive rents on new gas supplies produced at inframarginal costs, we
tolerate this potential in other industries as a reward to the particu-
larly efficient producer." The pipeline's incentive to shop and bar-
52. A purchased gas adjustment clause is a provision in a pipeline or distributor tariff
that permits changes in the rate that the utility can charge for gas because of changes in the
average cost that the utility must pay for its gas supply. Purchased gas adjustment clauses
typically authorize dollar-for-dollar pass-through of the increased cost of gas with little delay
and little, if any, regulatory review. Although they can be attacked with considerable justifi-
cation on a number of grounds, purchased gas adjustment clauses probably are essential to
maintain the financial viability of utilities during times of rapidly increasing costs. See
generally SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 1ST. SESs., REPORT ON ELECTRIC UTILITY AUTOMATIC FUEL
ADJUSTMENT CLAUSES (Comm. Print 1975).
One of the effects of a purchased gas adjustment clause is to remove the effects of
regulatory lag. While regulatory lag in recovering increased costs is the very evil that the
purchased gas adjustment clause was designed to eliminate, it is also one of jhe few incentives
for efficient management that the regulated company confronts. See 2 A. KAHN, ECONOMICS
OF REGULATION 48 (1971).
53. It has been argued that the elimination of regulatory lag in recovering the costs of
purchasing gas through the use of a clause leaves inadequate incentive for the utility to
negotiate a better price or to shop for a less expensive supply. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW § 12.5, at 260 (2d ed. 1977). A strong incentive for bargaining and shopping,
however, can be restored through adoption of a rate structure that imposes on the utility
marketability risks corresponding to the elasticity of demand for its product. See 2 A. KAHN,
supra note 52, at 102. To the extent that the demand for the utility's product is elastic, an
incentive to bargain and shop is created by such a change in rate structure. Reliable estimates
of the elasticity of demand for natural gas do not exist, but there seems to be general agree-
ment that the long-term demand for natural gas is elastic. See BREYER & MAcAvoy, supra
note 33, at 44-54; FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION, 1976 NATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK, at C-7,
C-10. See also notes 112 & 114 infra.
54. Continuing to control the price at which old gas can be sold eliminates a large
proportion of the excessive rents that producers might earn from selling gas produced at
inframarginal cost at a price based upon marginal cost, since it eliminates the effect of
temporal increases in industry marginal cost. See BREYER & MAcAvoY, supra note 33, at 64-
66.
A producer of new gas still may earn excessive rents from the sale of inframarginal
production at a marginal cost price, however, because no two producers will confront identical
marginal cost curves. The distributional implications of this residual ability to earn excess
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gain for the lowest price supply, however, is reduced greatly by the
present rate design under which interstate pipelines and their dis-
tributor customers resell the gas that they purchase. The first hypo-
thetical illustrated that a pipeline or distributor can purchase a new
gas supply at a high unit cost and, through the cost-averaging mech-
anism, resell the gas at a much lower unit price while recovering all
of its costs. Moreover, the availability of price-controlled old gas
insures that the market will not clear automatically; demand will
exceed supply at the average cost price. Thus, the pipeline or dis-
tributor faces no real marketability risk and has little incentive to
shop and bargain for the lowest price supply it can obtain.
Viewed in this light, the wholesale and retail rate design issue
interrelates directly with the recently "resolved" question whether
to deregulate in part the gas production market. If old gas prices
remain regulated, thereby controlling the amount of excessive rent
that can be earned from the bulk of inframarginal production, the
structure of the gas production industry and the low barriers to
entry into the industry ordinarily would suggest that the market
would produce acceptable results. 5 The structurally competitive
nature of the gas production industry has been recognized repeat-
edly." To the extent that significant imperfections in the market
exist, they stem from two sources-the potential for unusually high
rents can be eliminated only through direct economic regulation of the price at which each
individual gas supply can be sold or through some form of excess profits tax imposed upon
each producer. The national or area ceiling approach now used to control new gas prices
cannot effectively eliminate the potential for excess rents, and its continued use would ensure
a continued misallocation of resources. See Part VI(C) (2) infra. This is because a national or
area price ceiling imposes an effective limit on the kind of producing activity in which a
producer will engage. A producer subject to a national or area rate ceiling simply will not
explore for, or produce, gas with marginal costs higher than the generally applicable ceiling.
See BREYER & MAcAvoY, supra note 33, at 70. Thus, national and area ceilings on producer
prices control the level of exploration activity, not the level of producer profits.
Setting maximum producer rates through individualized determinations of the cost of
producing each gas well would eliminate the effect that area or national rate ceilings have
on production activity, while eliminating excessive rents resulting from the sale of inframar-
ginal production. The FPC, however, attempted to impose individual rates based on each
producer's costs in its initial effort to regulate producer prices and discovered that the task
of rate regulation using an individual cost-of-service approach is administratively impossible.
Its first ten proceedings required six years to complete, and by that time it had developed a
backlog of 2900 applications for producer rates. Id. at 68. See also Permian Basin Area Rate
Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 758 (1968). Thus, if potential excessive rents resulting from the sale of
inframarginal new gas supplies are considered a matter of sufficient concern, the only viable
approach to eliminate these rents is some form of excess profits tax analogous to that proposed
in Part VI(B)(3) infra for gas distributors. Direct economic regulation only can perpetuate a
gross misallocation of resources.
55. See generally BREYER & MAcAvoY, supra note 33, at 59-64.
56. Id.; Southern La. Area Rate Cases, 428 F.2d 407, 416 n.10 (5th Cir. 1970); see
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. at 756-57. See also Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 694-95 (1954) (Clark, J., dissenting).
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rents from inframarginal production, which can be kept within rea-
sonable bounds through continued control of old gas prices, "7 and
imperfections in the process of price bargaining between producers
and regulated pipelines.58 The latter is largely a function of present
wholesale and retail rate designs. The concern that producer prices
for new gas may soar if new gas prices are deregulated, resulting in
politically unacceptable transfers of wealth from consumers to prod-
ucers, appears to be justified if the present wholesale and retail rate
designs are retained. Market forces will not effectively constrain the
upward movement of producer prices for new gas so long as cost
averaging makes the gains from controlling the price of old infra-
marginal production available to the pipeline as a means of avoiding
its marketability risk.59 On the other hand, if a new rate design that
provides pipelines a strong incentive to shop and bargain for the
lowest price supplies available from producers can be devised and
implemented, by forcing the pipeline to face realistic marketability
risks, the last meritorious objection to deregulation of new gas sup-
plies may be eliminated."0
The potential increase in economic efficiency and reduction in
transaction costs that could be realized by substituting competition
for pervasive government regulation of the gas producing industry
are very great indeed. For instance, it has been estimated that work-
.able competition in the gas production industry would have resulted
in the discovery, at prices only a few cents per MCF higher than
price ceilings imposed by the FPC, of over twice as much new gas
between 1961 and 1968 than was discovered under federal regula-
tion.'
IV. RECENT PROPOSALS To ADOPT NEW RATE DESIGNS
The recent history of efforts to define and implement new
methods of apportioning costs among natural gas consumers
through actions by federal regulatory agencies began with Opinion
No. 622, issued by the Federal Power Commission in Columbia
LNG Corp. on June 28, 1972.2 In Columbia LNG three major inter-
57. See notes 33 & 54 supra.
58. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. at 792-94. But see BREYER & MAcAvoY,
supra note 33, at 61-62.
59. See Part II supra.
60. An argument still could be made in support of the need for a method of avoiding
excessive rents on inframarginal new gas production. If accepted, this argument should pro-
duce some form of excess profits tax rather than direct economic regulation of the price at
which new gas can be sold. See note 54 supra.
61. BREYER & MAcAvoY, supra note 33, at 78-87.
62. Columbia LNG Corp., 95 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 145 (1972).
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state pipelines proposed to import a total of approximately
1,000,000 MCF per day of liquified natural gas from sources in Al-
geria for use in offsetting the overall supply-demand imbalance that
had arisen on the three pipeline systems. The cost of the LNG to
the pipelines was estimated initially at $0.80 per MCF, 3 and the
pipelines proposed to average the cost of this new supply into their
overall cost of gas, resulting in an increase in the average unit cost
of gas to all customers from approximately $0.47 per MCF to ap-
proximately $0.58 per MCF14 The LNG then would be made avail-
able to each of the pipelines' customers in accordance with the
curtailment priorities applicable to all gas sold by the pipeline.
In Opinion No. 622 the FPC approved the Columbia LNG pro-
ject, but conditioned its approval upon the adoption of a method of
apportioning the costs of the Algerian LNG different from the
method proposed by the applicants. Describing the rate design issue
as "of paramount importance," the Commission held:
We reject the concept of rolling in relatively expensive supplemental gas sup-
ply costs with a pipeline's unit cost of gas supply. To do so would disguise the
economic cost of this LNG which we find is contrary to the public interest. We,
therefore, will require the filing by the purchasing jurisdictional pipelines of
separate LNG rate schedules, which reflect incremental costing concepts.
Thus, customers of Columbia, Consolidated, and Southern will be able to
contract, if they elect to do so, under a special rate schedule, for LNG service.
This special rate schedule shall reflect (a) the base import price which is
certified herein, (b) the cost of service of the regasified LNG to the existing
interstate pipeline, and (c) a fair allocation of cost of service of transport in
the existing jurisdictional pipeline to the customer. 5
Moreover, the FPC conditioned the certificates authorizing the
pipelines to sell the separately priced imported LNG upon the will-
ingness of each customer receiving the gas to agree to resell the gas
to ultimate consumers under separate rate schedules similar to
those that the pipelines were required to adopt." Notwithstanding
the requirement that the gas be sold under separate "incrementally-
priced"67 rate schedules, for purposes of curtailment because of gas
supply shortage, the LNG would be considered a part of the total
gas supply available to the pipeline system.18 The net result would
63. Id. at 152.
64. Id. at 157-58.
65. Id. at 159.
66. Id. at 160.
67. As discussed in Part V(A) infra, the FPC's description of the rate design imposed
in Columbia LNG as "incremental pricing" is a misnomer because the rates that distributors
and consumers would be required to pay for the LNG would exceed incremental (or marginal)
cost to the extent that sunk costs are included in the overall rate calculation.
68. Id. at 159.
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have been that the customers and consumers who were classified in
the lowest curtailment priorities could obtain gas only if they were
willing to pay the incremental price of imported LNG. These cus-
tomers, however, would be unable to obtain gas at any price when-
ever the aggregate gas supply of the pipeline, including LNG, was
inadequate to provide service to the curtailment priority in which
they were classified. 9
Opinion No. 622 met opposition by virtually all parties to the
proceeding. Applications for rehearing of the opinion contended
that: (1) the separate pricing scheme adopted by the Commission
would create an administrative nightmare;"0 (2) the FPC exceeded
its jurisdiction in purporting to condition the availability of LNG
to gas distributors upon the willingness of those distributors to resell
the gas under a separate rate schedule;7' (3) the combination of
69. It is important to distinguish between the two situations in which LNG service to a
customer might be curtailed. First, the service curtailment could result from an interruption
in the supply of LNG itself. This risk of curtailment is unique to the particular project and
certainly should be borne by the customer who is faced with the decision to commit to
purchase the LNG. The second potential cause of curtailment of the LNG service is a dimi-
nution of the aggregate supply of gas from other sources that would force curtailment to the
customers in priorities higher than the customer who committed to purchase the LNG unless
the LNG is diverted to the higher priority customers. This is the sense in which the Commis-
sion subjected the LNG in Columbia LNG to curtailment, and it is the sense in which
subjecting incrementally priced supplies to curtailment can destroy the financial viability of
economically desirable projects. The potential for diversion of the LNG supply to higher
priority consumers is not a risk associated with the LNG project; it is a risk (indeed, a cer-
tainty given the present natural gas regulatory system) associated with all other supplies of
gas. Forcing the potential purchaser of LNG to confront both the particular risks associated
with the LNG project and the general risk that aggregate demand for gas will exceed aggre-
gate supply disassociates the costs and benefits of the project to such an extent that the
decisions of consumers to commit or not to commit to participate in the project are not a
reliable indicator of the project's economic societal desirability. See Part V(A) infra.
70. The use of a separate rate schedule for every new supply of gas would create a
situation in which eventually each distributor's and each consumer's rates would have to be
determined separately based upon the percentage of the supply received by that distributor
or customer from each separately priced supply source. With distributors typically purchas-
ing from several pipelines, which in turn purchase from other pipelines, and with each pipe-
line ultimately adding many new sources of gas supply, the spectre was raised of a rate case
in which hundreds of individual rates must be set and applied in differing proportions to each
customer. See Aman & Howard, supra note 15, at 1133-34.
This criticism of separate rate schedules for each new gas supply is well-founded. Incre-
mental or marginal cost pricing, however, could be implemented without separate rate sched-
ules for each new supply through other procedures, such as calculating the pipeline's marginal
cost with reference to the most expensive ten percent of the pipeline's total gas supply, and
then applying the resulting rate to the last 10% of supply made available by the pipeline to
each of its customers. See Part VI(B)(1) infra.
71. The Hinshaw Amendment to the Natural Gas Act exempts from Federal Power
Commission jurisdiction all persons who "engage in the transportation in interstate com-
merce or the sale in interstate commerce for resale, of natural gas received by such person
from another person within or at the boundary of a State if all the natural gas so received is
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incremental pricing and rolled-in allocation under the pipeline's
curtailment plan was unfair to low priority consumers and distribu-
tors that served a particularly high percentage of low priority con-
sumers; 72 and (4) the project could not be financed with the combi-
nation of conditions imposed by the FPC.73
On rehearing the FPC responded with Opinion No. 622-A, is-
sued October 5, 1972.74 In this Opinion, the Commission retained
the condition that the LNG be sold under separate incrementally
priced rate schedules,75 but it abandoned the other two conditions
imposed in Opinion No. 622. Although expressly refusing to concede
the jurisdictional issue, the Commission withdrew the condition
that distributors could obtain the LNG only if they agreed to sell it
to consumers on separate incremental cost rate schedules. 76 The
Commission also stated that the LNG would not be subject to the
curtailment priorities applicable to other gas supplies on the pipe-
line system, but would be available exclusively to the customers
who committed to purchase the gas at incremental cost. 77
With the modifications to Opinion No. 622 adopted on rehear-
ultimately consumed within such State. . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 717(c) (1976). Thus, at least
arguably, the Commission has no jurisdiction to control the rates charged by distributor
customers of a pipeline for gas received from the pipeline and resold by the distributor.
The Natural Gas Act also empowers the Commission to attach "such reasonable terms
and conditions as the public convenience and necessity may require" to a certificate authoriz-
ing an interstate pipeline to sell gas. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (1976). This conditioning power has
been interpreted expansively to permit the Commission to consider and to affect the way in
which gas is sold and used after it leaves the interstate pipeline and is no longer subject to
the Commission's direct jurisdiction. See, e.g., FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.,
365 U.S. 1 (1961); Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1973). If the power
to condition pipeline certificates were held to include imposition of conditions that directly
affect distributor rate design, it is hard to find any residual meaning in the Hinshaw Amend-
ment.
72. The Natural Gas Act makes unlawful any rate that is "unjust, unreasonable, [or]
unduly discriminatory." 15 U.S.C. § 717d (1976). In two cases Commission efforts to set
higher rates for industrial consumers have been rejected on grounds that the just and reasona-
ble standard does not authorize the establishment of higher rates for industrial consumers.
FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 616 (1944); Fuels Research Council, Inc. v. FPC,
374 F.2d 842, 854 (7th Cir. 1967). The vitality of this aspect of the holdings in Hope and Fuels
Research, however, is highly questionable today. See United Gas Pipeline Co., 50 F.P.C. 1348
(1973), aff'd sub nom. Consolidated Gas Supply Corp. v. FPC, 520 F.2d 1176, 1182-84 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (dictum).
Perhaps a better argument of unlawfulness can be made based upon the undue discrimi-
nation prohibition. No case authority on point exists, but it simply does not seem equitable
for low priority consumers, such as industrial consumers, to receive the lowest quality gas
service because of the end-use curtailment system, while simultaneously being required to
pay the highest rate for that service. See Aman & Howard, supra note 15, at 1140.
73. See Part V(A) infra.
74. Columbia LNG Corp., 96 Pus. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 389 (1972).
75. Id. at 395.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 394.
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ing, the pipeline sponsors were successful in financing the project, 8
but were so displeased with the FPC's treatment of the cost alloca-
tion issue that they filed in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit petitions for review of both opinions. On March 25,
1974, in Columbia LNG Corp. v. FPC,75 the Fifth Circuit reversed
Opinions No. 622 and No. 622-A and remanded the proceeding to
the Commission for further hearings. The reversal was based upon
concern that the Commission had inadequately explored the prob-
lems inherent in the new rate design. Since the method of cost
allocation adopted by the Commission was a departure from prior
policy and was alluded to only generally in ten pages of a 14,500
page hearing transcript, the court found that the Commission's
adoption of the new method of allocating costs was not supported
by substantial evidence."0
On remand from the Fifth Circuit's decision, the FPC held
additional hearings over several months devoted almost exclusively
to the rate design issue. These hearings concluded on January 21,
1977, with the issuance of Opinion No. 786.81 In this Opinion the
Commission withdrew all the rate design conditions imposed in
Opinions No. 622 and No. 622-A. The approach taken in Opinion
No. 622 was rejected because by subjecting low priority consumers
to incremental pricing and subjecting the LNG to curtailment along
with all other supplies of gas available to the pipeline, low priority
consumers must commit to purchase the LNG at incremental prices
without assurance that they would receive the benefits of the supply
as gas shortages increased in severity.,2 Consequently, low priority
consumers would be unwilling to sign long-term contracts to pur-
chase the LNG. In the absence of executed long-term purchase con-
tracts, lenders would be unwilling to finance supply projects subject
78. One may argue that the ability of the sponsors of the Columbia LNG project to
obtain financing of that project with an incremental pricing condition demonstrates that
incremental pricing will not destroy the financial viability of economically desirable gas
supply projects. Two important differences exist, however, between the circumstances in
which financing was obtained for the Columbia project and the circumstances in which
financing for new gas supply projects must be obtained today. First, the Columbia project
was financed under conditions of incremental pricing combined with an assurance of a firm
noncurtailable supply before curtailment of so-called "firm" supplies became a matter of
daily routine. Under today's circumstances, the assurance of noncurtailment would no longer
be given credence by potential purchasers. See Part V(B) infra. Second, the price of the gas
resulting from the Columbia project was much lower than the price at which gas from today's
new supply projects must be sold. See Part II supra. Thus, the marketability risk was much
lower than it would be for a comparable project today.
79. 491 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1974).
80. Id. at 654-55.
81. Columbia LNG Corp., UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 11,894 (1977).
82. Id. at 14,367.
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to incremental pricing. 3 The Opinion No. 622-A approach was re-
jected because the Commission feared that, by failing to subject the
LNG supply to pipeline end-use curtailment plans, low priority con-
sumers and their distributor suppliers could continue to receive gas
through their noncurtailable contracts to purchase LNG, while high
priority customers, such as residential consumers, would be unable
to obtain any gas because of the continued decline in gas available
from traditional sources."4
Thus, the Commission ultimately authorized the Columbia
LNG project on the basis upon which it was originally pro-
posed-average cost pricing and potential curtailment. In Opinion
No. 786, however, the Commission warned that its action should not
be considered to have precedential significance. It noted specifi-
cally that it was influenced by the fact that the LNG made available
through the Columbia project cost substantially less than other
types of supplemental supplies under active consideration at the
time and, if the cost of the LNG were averaged in with the cost of
other gas supplies then available to the pipelines, it would increase
the average cost of gas to the pipelines by only nine to seventeen
cents per MCF.88 During the seven years in which the Columbia
LNG project was in litigation, the estimated cost of the LNG supply
increased from approximately $0.80 per MCF to approximately
$1.75 per MCF.7
While Columbia LNG was pending decision by the FPC after
the Fifth Circuit's remand, the Commission proposed a change in
its method of apportioning the energy costs of natural gas on all
pipeline systems. In a notice of rulemaking issued February 20,
1975, entitled "End Use Rate Schedules,"8 8 the Commission ex-
pressed great concern that although a significant and growing im-
balance of supply and demand necessitated regular curtailments of
service, industrial consumers of natural gas~were able to purchase
gas at prices substantially below the replacement cost of gas and
below the cost of other fuels because of the average cost method of
apportioning energy costs. 9 To remedy this situation, the Commis-
sion proposed the implementation of a new rate design that would
apportion the full cost of all expensive "new" gas9" and supplemen-
83. Id.
84. Id. at 14,370.
85. Id. at 14,371-72.
86. Id. at 14,371.
87. Id. at 14,369.
88. 40 Fed. Reg. 8571 (1975).
89. Id. at 8572.
90. "New" gas was defined as gas purchased from any source under a contract dated
after December 31, 1972. Id.
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tal gas9' to a separate rate schedule applicable to all industrial con-
sumers of gas. The notice did not clarify how the proposed rate
design would interact with pipeline curtailment plans. With very
few exceptions,92 the hundreds of parties who responded to the Com-
mission's notice of rulemaking attacked the proposal on grounds
similar to those relied upon in attacking Opinion No. 622 in
Columbia LNG. The rulemaking theoretically remains an active
proceeding, but the FPC has taken no action in it since the initial
deluge of unfavorable comments was received.
Although the Commission received adamant opposition to in-
cremental pricing in response to Opinions No. 622 and No. 622-A
and the End Use Rate Schedules proposal, and although the Com-
mission experienced difficulties in reconciling incremental pricing
with end-use curtailment, the Commission once more attempted to
move to incremental pricing by attaching conditions to another pro-
posed LNG import project. Trunkline Gas Company proposed to
import 520,000 MCF per day of LNG from Algeria at an estimated
cost of $3.37 per MCF. In Opinion No. 796, issued in Trunkline LNG
on April 29, 1977,' 3 the Commission conditioned the certificate ap-
proving this project upon the sale of the LNG under a separate
incrementally priced rate schedule. 4 The Opinion did not clarify
whether the LNG would be subject to curtailment or sold on a
noncurtailable basis. State commissions with jurisdiction over dis-
tributors purchasing gas from Trunkline were encouraged, but not
ordered, to require the distributors to resell the LNG to consumers
under separate rate schedules at full incremental cost so that
"ultimate consumers of the LNG will be charged the true cost of the
LNG and will therefore be able to make truly rational consumption
decisions."95 Opinion No. 786, decided only a few months before
Opinion No. 796, was distinguished on the grounds that the LNG
that was the subject of that order was priced only slightly higher
than the national rate applicable to new domestically produced gas
supplies, while the LNG that Trunkline proposed to import cost
more than twice the price permitted for new gas produced in the
United States.9
Opinion No. 796 had a very short life. On June 30, 1977, the
91. Supplemental gas was defined to include "LNG, SNG and other synthetic gas
." Id.
92. Of the 273 parties filing comments on the Commission's proposal, 264 opposed it.
See Aman & Howard, supra note 15, at 1145.
93. Trunkline LNG Co., UT. L. RPP. (CCH) 11,942 (1977).
94. Id. at 12,214.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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Commission issued Opinion No. 796-A in response to multiple ap-
plications for rehearing filed by pipelines, distributors, consumers,
and state commissions." In Opinion No. 796-A the Commission
once again retreated from an effort to reallocate energy costs, per-
mitting the LNG to be imported and sold under the traditional
average cost rate design method. The retreat in Opinion No. 796-A
was justified on essentially the same grounds that formed the basis
for Opinion No. 786-subjecting incrementally priced supplies to
end-use curtailment would undermine the financial viability of the
project, and permitting low priority consumers to "tie-up" LNG
supplies through long-term noncurtailable contracts would leave
high priority consumers without gas when production from other
sources declines.9 8
The FPC has not been alone in attempting to impose new natu-
ral gas rate designs at the federal level." Congress also has at-
tempted to require variations from the present average cost method
of calculating rates. In 1975 the United States Senate passed S.
2310, which included a provision designed to require the adoption
of a rate design similar to that proposed in the Commission's End
Use Rate Schedules rulemaking.00 Under this provision the cost of
all "new" gas and all supplemental supplies would have been im-
posed entirely upon industrial consumers through a separate rate
schedule. The Bill would have continued to include these high cost
supplies within the curtailment plans of the interstate pipelines.
This proposed statutory change in rate design never became law
because S. 2310 also removed "new" gas prices at the wellhead from
FPC jurisdiction, and the House of Representatives was unwilling
to accept such a deregulation measure.'0 '
Natural gas rate design issues also were addressed in the energy
legislation passed by the House and Senate in response to President
Carter's proposed National Energy Plan. The compromise that the
Senate and House have approved allocates most of the costs of new
gas that exceed $1.42 per MCF to low priority consumers until the
97. Trunkline LNG Co., UwL. L. REP. (CCH) T 11,970 (1977).
98. Id. at 12,442-43.
99. The Federal Energy Administration (FEA) has attempted to require that gas dis-
tributors who receive an allocation of petroleum product feedstocks from the FEA for use as
a raw material in the manufacture of synthetic gas resell the synthetic gas on an incremen-
tally priced basis. The FEA, however, has never explained how its version of incremental
pricing would work, and a district court has held that the FEA does not have the authority
to require a gas distributor to adopt incremental pricing as a condition precedent to the
receipt of a petroleum product allocation from the FEA. Consumers Power Co. v. FEA, 413
F. Supp. 1024 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
100. S. 2310, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 28, 121 CoNG. REc. 33,655, 33,658-59 (1975).
101. See note 7 supra.
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rate that those consumers must pay equals the price of No. 2 fuel
oil.102 After low priority consumers reach this rate level, the FERC
and state agencies are free to adopt any method of allocating costs
consistent with other provisions of law. 03
In recent years some proceedings before state regulatory agen-
cies have concerned natural gas rate designs.'0 ' The goal of most
state-level attempts to redesign natural gas rates, however, has been
to alter the distributional effects of present rate designs, rather than
to enhance the allocative efficiency lacking in the present method
of allocating costs. Some version of the so-called "lifeline rate" typi-
cally is the focus of attention.'05 Whether any incidental enhance-
ment of allocative efficiency would result from modifications of this
type is not clear.' 6
102. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-621, §§ 201-208.
103. Id. § 204(d)(2).
104. See sources cited at note 14 supra.
105. The "lifeline rate" typically permits a small volume residential consumer of natu-
ral gas or electricity to purchase up to a particular quantity of gas or electricity at a rate that
is set below the utility's cost-of-service in an effort to insulate poor people from some of the
effects of soaring utility costs. See generally Aman & Howard, supra note 15, at 1118-21;
Frank, Lifeline Proposals and Economic Efficiency Requirements, 99 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 11
(May 26, 1977). The rates applicable to some or all of the utility's other customers then must
be increased in order to offset the revenue deficiency that would otherwise result from the
noncompensatory lifeline rate. Lifeline rates of this type are unlikely to further their putative
goal of income redistribution. One of the critical assumptions underlying the lifeline rate
approach is that there is a strong negative correlation between wealth and amount of gas
consumption. The empirical evidence at present suggests that there is no such correlation.
OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION, supra note 14, at 81-89; see Everett & Malko,
Measuring the Impact of Residential Gas and Electric Rates, 100 Pua. UTIL. FORT. 20 (Dec.
22, 1977).
No case has been found in which a state utility commission has attempted explicitly to
implement marginal cost pricing principles in setting natural gas rates. It is possible, how-
ever, that some of the more sophisticated state commissions attempt to reflect marginal cost
principles in their decisions on other seemingly unrelated rate issues, without explicitly
relying upon allocative efficiency as the justification for their decision. See Kahn, Can an
Economist Find Happiness Setting Public Utility Rates?, 101 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 11, 14-15 (Jan.
5, 1978).
106. To the extent that lifeline rates force the rates of consumers not subject to the
lifeline rate closer to marginal cost, they will increase allocative efficiency. Nevertheless, this
increased allocative efficiency will be offset by a corresponding decrease in efficiency resulting
from setting the lifeline rate even farther below marginal cost than a traditional average cost
rate. A net increase in allocative efficiency would result only if the lifeline rate consumer's
demand for gas is significantly more inelastic than the demand by the consumers whose rates
are increased in order to provide the subsidized rate to low volume users. Detailed studies of
relative demand elasticities would be required to determine whether the net change in alloca-
tive efficiency is positive or negative. The recent studies indicating that gas demand by
residential consumers is more elastic than gas demand by industrial consumers illustrates the
danger of substituting intuition for data in making decisions that assume a particular rela-
tionship between elasticities of demand by class of consumer or level of consumption. See
notes 112 & 114 infra. Of course, the distributional goals of lifeline rates may be attainable
consistent with efficiency enhancement goals through some form of marginal cost pricing,
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V. THE PROBABLE EFFECT ON ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY OF THE
PRINCIPAL PROPOSED RATE DESIGNS
Viewed as a means of solving the problems ascribed in the
beginning of this Article to the present method of apportioning costs
among gas consumers, each of the proposals that has surfaced in
recent debates at the FPC and in Congress falls wide of the mark
and raises significant unnecessary collateral problems. For purposes
of analysis, the proposals can be divided conveniently into three
groups: 0 incremental pricing subject to curtailment (including
Opinion No. 622, Opinion No. 796, and the 1975 Senate Bill); incre-
mental pricing not subject to curtailment (as exemplified by Opin-
ion No. 622-A); and incremental pricing up to the price of alternate
fuels (the approach ultimately adopted in the Natural Gas Policy
Act of 1978). The collateral problems raised by each kind of pro-
posal, particularly the difficult interrelationship between rate de-
sign, end-use curtailment, and financing major gas supply projects,
are serious and deserve some attention."' The analysis of each group
of proposals, however, must begin with the recognition that none
would achieve the desired goal of enhancing allocative efficiency.
A. Incremental Pricing Subject to Curtailment
The basic objective of any rate design that is intended to im-
prove allocative efficiency must be to create rates that confront each
consumer with the marginal cost of the commodity or service that
is available to him. The equation of price and marginal cost fre-
quently is referred to as "[t]he central policy prescription of mi-
croeconomics."'" Marginal cost is defined as the costs that could be
avoided by producing one less unit of a good or service.110 Its utility
with a consumer rebate or excess profits tax that distributes the gains of regulation dispropor-
tionately to poor people. See Part VI(B)(2)-(3) infra. See also Frank, supra note 105, at 11.
107. There are distinct differences between some of the proposals that are included in
each group, particularly with respect to the administrative problems raised by each. In terms
of their functional effect, however, the proposals contained within a group are largely fungi-
ble.
108. The practical deficiencies of several of the proposals are discussed in some detail
in Aman & Howard, supra note 15, at 1129-39.
109. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 20, at 65. See also J. BONBPIGHT, supra note 20, at 317-18;
J. SUELFLOW, PuBuc UTILITY AccOUNUING: THEORY AND APPLICATION 245-46 (1973).
110. This is only one of many possible ways of defining marginal cost. See note 109
supra. All of the definitions, however, yield the same result when properly applied. The
reference throughout this Article is to short-term, rather than long-term, marginal cost.
Short-term marginal cost is the preferable pricing criterion for obtaining optimal resource
allocation. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 20, at 70-77. There are circumstances in which considera-
tions of administrative implementation, equity, or even efficiency require use of long-term
marginal costs. This apparently is the case in the electric utility industry where use of short-
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to a market-oriented economy lies in its reflecting that every deci-
sion to produce (or-to purchase) an additional unit of any good is
necessarily also a decision to forego the production (or purchase) of
some other good. Put in the context of natural gas pricing, every
consumer is faced with the choice of purchasing an additional unit
of natural gas -or placing comparable funds into functional substi-
tutes such as other fuels, insulation, and more efficient appliances.
The present averaging method of allocating the costs of producing
natural gas, combined with the substantial quantities of gas avail-
able at regulated prices reflecting inframarginal cost, produces rates
to all consumers that understate significantly the costs that could
be avoided if one less unit of gas were produced."' Incremental
pricing is a response to this problem.
Incremental pricing, properly defined and applied, is essen-
tially identical to marginal cost pricing. ' 2 As implicitly defined by
the FPC and Congress, however, incremental pricing does not pro-
duce the desired goal of confronting each consumer with the avoida-
ble costs of purchasing an additional unit of gas. First, only one
group of consumers, industrial consumers, is confronted with a price
that purportedly is based upon marginal cost. Consequently, the
other groups of consumers, residential and commercial, necessarily
are confronted with a price that is less indicative of marginal cost
than the average cost price that all consumers confront under pres-
ent rate designs. This selective implementation of marginal cost
pricing is defended on the theory that, since it is extremely expen-
sive for residential and commercial consumers to convert to alter-
nate fuels, whereas industrial consumers can convert at lower costs,
it makes little difference if residential consumers are confronted
with rates lower than marginal cost. In the language of the econo-
mist, residential and commercial consumers' demand for natural
term marginal cost is undesirable because it is very difficult to measure and would produce
rapidly fluctuating rates. See Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 5 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 28 (Wis.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974). See also 1 A. KAHN, supra note 20, at 83-86; Cudahy & Malko,
Electric Peak-Load Pricing: Madison Gas and Beyond, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 47. The cost charac-
teristics of the gas industry differ substantially from those of the electric utility industry.
Short-term marginal cost of gas probably is easier to measure than long-term marginal cost,
and because new sources of gas supply typically are flowing constantly for a very long period
after they are added to a pipeline or distribution system, rates based upon the short-term
marginal cost of gas would not tend to fluctuate rapidly.
In one sense the term marginal cost is not used in a manner consistent with its classic
definition. To base a calculation of the marginal cost of gas upon the avoidable costs of
purchasing one additional unit is not practical. Rather, some larger increment of supply
should be used to reflect indivisibilities inherent in gas supply projects and to ease the
administrative burden of calculating avoidable costs.
111. See Parts II & I supra.
112. See note 109 supra.
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gas is assumed to be perfectly inelastic. This unstated assumption
underlying the incremental pricing proposals of the FPC and Con-
gress is at best an empirically unsupported generalization that does
not withstand even a priori analysis." 3 Apparently, the reasoning is
as follows: Replacement of gas burning combustion equipment or
conversion to alternate fuels in a home or office costs a great deal;
therefore, residential and commercial consumers have an inelastic
demand for gas.
Even if the factual predicate were correct-studies of elasticity
of demand for natural gas by customer class suggest that it is
not-this reasoning ignores the many options open to residential
and commercial consumers of natural gas in addition to total con-
version to alternate fuels. For example, these consumers can reduce
significantly their consumption by winterizing their homes, substi-
tuting electric ignition devices for constantly burning gas pilot
lights, purchasing more efficient gas burning appliances when re-
placement is required, installing solar heating equipment to serve a
portion of heating needs, or in some cases, simply by turning down
the thermostats on their swimming pools."' In addition, with little
or no cost penalty, potential new gas consumers can select initially
an appliance that does not burn gas. Few reliable studies of elastic-
ity of demand for natural gas exist today, but the attempts that
have been made to measure demand elasticity suggest strongly that
natural gas demand by residential and commercial consumers is far
from perfectly inelastic. Apparently, long-term demand for gas is
more elastic for residential consumers than for industrial consum-
ers."5 By distorting further the present disparity between residential
113. Indeed, a recent study of elasticity of demand for gas by customer classification
indicates that residential demand is more elastic than industrial demand in the long term.
The Federal Energy Administration has estimated that long-term elasticity of demand for
natural gas is .721 for residential and commercial consumers and .392 for industrial consum-
ers. In the short term, residential and industrial demand were found to have approximately
the same elasticity, while commercial demand was found to be much more elastic than either
residential or industrial demand. FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION, 1976 NATIONAL ENERGY
OUTLOOK C-7, C-10. Several other demand elasticity studies have reached similar conclusions.
See note 115 infra. This attempt at gross measurement of demand elasticities by customer
classification is not very helpful because each customer class encompasses numerous end
uses, each of which results in a different demand elasticity. See RATE DESIGN, supra note 15,
ch. 5, at 10-13.
114. See, e.g., Investigation on the Commission's Own Motion into the Adequacy and
Reliability of Energy and Fuel Requirements and Supply of Electric Public Utilities in
California, Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Dec. No. 85,205 (Dec. 30, 1975) (banning new gas connec-
tions to heat swimming pools and suggesting the need for higher rates for natural gas service
already being provided to heat swimming pools) (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Law
Review).
115. The Federal Energy Administration has estimated the elasticity of demand for
residential consumers as .193 in the short term and .721 in the long term. FEDERAL ENERGY
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and commercial gas rates and the marginal cost of gas, the imposi-
tion of rates based upon incremental costs solely upon industrial
consumers will exacerbate the present tendency of residential and
commercial gas customers to engage in overconsumption.
A second characteristic of incremental pricing as proposed by
the FPC ensures that its implementation would not further the
allocative goals of marginal cost pricing. The industrial consumer
class that, in theory, would be confronted with marginal cost under
the FPC's approach actually would be asked to pay a price greater
than marginal cost. The FPC's approach examines the costs of ac-
quiring an additional MCF of gas, properly concludes that these
costs are all avoidable, and therefore includes the unit cost of ac-
quiring the most expensive gas supply in the calculation of marginal
cost. The FPC, however, then simply adds the marginal cost of
acquiring an additional unit of gas to the other costs of providing
natural gas service, without analyzing the other components of the
present natural gas rates to determine whether they consist entirely
of avoidable costs. In other words, the rate designs adopted in Opin-
ions No. 622 and No. 796, as well as in S. 2310, passed by the Senate
in 1975, would require that the customers designated to pay the
incremental price of a new gas supply pay a rate which reflects the
marginal cost of acquiring an additional MCF of gas plus the
average cost of transporting, storing, and distributing that unit of
gas. Marginal costs, however, should not include all such costs be-
cause the fixed costs of transportation and distribution cannot be
avoided by a decision not to produce or not to purchase the last unit
of output. Given the present and certain future existence of excess
capacity in the gas transportation and distribution industry, a high
percentage of the average costs of transporting and distributing gas
are sunk costs."' By including sunk costs in the calculation of the
ADMINISTRATION, supra note 113, at C-7, C-10. This suggests that long-term demand by resi-
dential consumers is relatively elastic. Other studies have indicated much higher elasticities
of demand. One commentator surveyed exhaustively the published and unpublished studies
of elasticity of demand for natural gas that were conducted between 1953 and 1976. See
Taylor, The Demand for Energy: A Survey of Price and Income Elasticities, in INT'L STUDIES
OF THE DEMAND FOR ENERGY 3 (W. Nordhaus ed. 1977). Professor Taylor concludes that
although the literature is too thin to permit reliable measurement of magnitude, elasticity of
demand for natural gas in all demand categories is different from zero. Id. at 20. He suggests
that long-term elasticity is at least 0.9. Id. The range of elasticities reported for the residential
sector varies from 0.69 to 3.00, while the range reported for industrial demand is 0.58 to 2.11.
Id. at 21.
116. For instance, the annual depreciation of transmission and distribution lines, esti-
mated to be approximately $2.3 billion in note 36 supra, is included in present natural gas
rates. These costs, however, must be considered sunk costs, since the physical life of a gas
pipeline is extremely long, and no conceivable set of future circumstances could cause
additional pipeline capacity to be built.
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incremental rate, the FPC's method yields a rate in excess of mar-
ginal cost. Setting rates in excess of marginal cost can result in a
suboptimal allocation of resources as easily as setting rates below
marginal cost. The supra-marginal cost rate will induce those sub-
ject to it to purchase less of the good than they should based upon
the actual costs that society must incur to make an additional unit
of gas available. In this instance, the calculation upon which the
industrial consumer's cost of gas would be based indicates that
society must invest in a substantial network of high pressure trans-
mission mains and low pressure distribution lines in order to provide
another increment of gas to the consumer, when the entire transpor-
tation network is already in place, is only partially in use, and has
very little value for any alternative use. 1 7
Directionally, it is easy to see what would happen on the con-
sumption side of the equation as a result of the FPC's incremental
price formula-residential consumers would purchase more gas
than they should, while industrial consumers would purchase less
than they should. A simple example illustrates how this would
occur. Assume that an integrated pipeline-distribution system cur-
rently is selling gas to residential consumers for $1.50 per MCF and
to industrial consumers for $1.25 per MCF. This rate can be broken
down into components of $0.50 per MCF energy cost for each cus-
tomer (representing the average cost of gas purchased by the pipe-
line) and transportation and distribution costs of $1.00 per MCF for
residential consumers and $0.75 per MCF for industrial consum-
ers.'"8 Assume further that the transportation and distribution costs
consist of $0.25 per MCF in variable (or avoidable) costs for each
class" 9 and $0.75 and $0.50 per MCF in sunk costs for residential
and industrial consumers, respectively. Under the FPC's incremen-
tal pricing formula, if the pipeline purchases a new supply of gas at
$2.50 per MCF, the rate charged to residential consumers remains
117. It is conceivable that a few natural gas transmission lines have potential value for
transporting crude oil or petroleum products. El Paso Natural Gas Company recently ob-
tained authorization to convert one of its gas pipelines to transportation of crude oil. See El
Paso Natural Gas Co., UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 12,020 (1977). To the extent that such alternate
uses exist for capital assets used in the transportation and distribution of natural gas, there
are opportunity costs associated with the continued use of the assets that should be reflected
in a calculation of the marginal cost of transporting natural gas. There is, however, no known
alternate use for most of the fixed assets used in the transportation and distribution of gas.
118. Residential customers typically pay higher distribution costs because a greater
investment in facilities per unit of gas delivered is required to serve a small residential
customer than to serve a larger industrial customer.
119. Actually, the variable costs of distribution incurred to serve a residential customer
will be greater than the variable cost of serving an industrial customer per unit of gas deliv-
ered. The same unit cost figure is used for both only to simplify the hypothetical.
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$1.50 per MCF, $1.25 per MCF below the pipeline's marginal cost.'20
The industrial rate goes to $3.25 per MCF, $0.50 above the pipe-
line's marginal cost. If the residential consumer has a choice of
buying an additional unit of gas or installing insulation at a cost
equivalent to $2.00 per MCF, he will elect to purchase the addi-
tional unit of gas, thereby costing society $0.75 per MCF in wasted
resources. If the industrial consumer has a choice of purchasing a
unit of gas at a price of $3.25 per MCF or purchasing an equivalent
unit of oil at a price of $3.00 per MCF, it will purchase the unit of
oil, thereby costing society $0.25 per MCF in wasted resources. It is
virtually impossible to calculate the aggregate waste of resources on
the consumption side that result from this method of designing rates
based partly on marginal cost and party on average costs, but it is
safe to assume that the total unnecessary societal cost would be
substantial.
The net effect of the FPC's incremental pricing system on the
production side of the equation is difficult to predict even direction-
ally because demand for gas by the residential sector would be arti-
ficially increased simultaneously with an artificial reduction in the
demand for gas by the industrial sector. The interaction of end-use
curtailment expectations, incremental pricing, and financing re-
quirements for major gas supply projects, however, suggests that the
net result of the FPC's rate design would be underproduction of gas.
New gas supply projects today typically are capital-intensive.
For instance, the capital investment required to bring approxi-
mately 2.4 billion cubic feet of Alaskan gas per day from Prudhoe
Bay is estimated to be in excess of $10 billion. 2' The investment
required to import one billion cubic feet of gas per day from Algeria
is estimated to be over $5 billion,12 and a coal gasification plant
capable of manufacturing 250,000 MCF of gas per day is estimated
to cost $447 million.123 Economies of scale and indivisibilities in the
factors of production make smaller scale projects, which require
smaller investments, impractical. For these very substantial com-
mitments, the natural gas industry must look to external financing
120. The pipeline's marginal cost in the hypothetical is simply the new marginal cost
of energy ($2.50) plus the marginal cost of transportation and distribution ($0.25).
121. The White House has estimated that the natural gas pipeline from Prudhoe Bay
to the lower 48 states will cost between $10.472 billion and $13.857 billion. Executive Office
of the President, Decision and Report to Congress on the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation
System 157 (1977).
122. Tenneco Atlantic Pipeline Co., FPC No. CP 77-100 (Nov. 2, 1977) (initial deci-
sion).
123. Transwestern Coal Gasification Co., UL. L. REP. (CCH) 11,669, at 12,998
(1975).
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sources, principally institutional investors. Investors generally, and
institutional investors in particular, look for low risk investments,
and when investing hundreds of millions, or billions, of dollars in a
single project, institutional investors can be expected to examine
very carefully the risks inherent in the investment. One major risk
in a gas supply project is that at some point the gas will not be
marketable. This risk is largely eliminated under the present aver-
age cost rate design employed in the natural gas industry, since the
large volumes of old gas flowing into a pipeline system provide a
large cushion that permits the purchase of a new supply at a high
unit cost without a corresponding increase in cost to consumers.
Thus, given adequate tariff provisions,"' investors are willing to
place large sums of money at risk in gas supply projects when the
new gas is permitted to be sold on an average cost basis.
When the gas must be sold under a separate incremental rate
schedule to low priority consumers, the investment community, in
effect, is being asked to project the supply and demand for natural
gas over the life of the project, typically twenty to thirty years. This
entails guesswork concerning domestic political and regulatory deci-
sions and world political and economic conditions. 25 The invest-
ment community understandably is overawed by the task and seeks
some substitute for this difficult and hazardous long-term forecast-
ing. It reasons that if low priority consumers or their suppliers are
willing to sign long-term purchase contracts obligating themselves
to take or pay for the aggregate output of the gas supply project
under an incremental pricing schedule, its capital return is reasona-
bly assured; otherwise, it perceives the marketability risks as being
too great. In short, the investors turn to the low priority consumers
to perform the task of forecasting future supply and demand by
requiring the consumers to bear the risk that future conditions will
124. In addition to the issue whether the output of a new gas supply project will be
priced on a rolled-in or incrementally priced basis, there are a number of other price-related
provisions of the certificate authorizing a major new gas supply project that can adversely'
effect its financial viability. See, e.g., Trunkline LNG Co., Urm. L. REP. (CCH) 11,970, at
12,443-45 (1977). Of course, these complications would be removed if the price of new gas
supplies from all sources were deregulated, as suggested in Part VI(C)(3) infra. With an
unregulated rate of return, investors should be much more willing to assume the risks inherent
in a proposed gas supply project. If insufficient capital can be attracted to the project with
an unregulated rate of return, it is fair to draw the inference that the project is not economi-
cally desirable.
125. The long-term aggregate supply and demand for natural gas can be affected signifi-
cantly by a myriad of factors, many of which are difficult to forecast. They include actions
of the United States government, such as decisions to permit or forbid development of hydro-
carbons on the outer continental shelf, and international developments, such as decisions by
Saudi Arabia to reduce or accelerate the rate at which it produces crude oil.
19781 1125
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
make the gas output of the project appear less attractive than alter-
nate means of meeting energy requirements. So far, the description
of the financial community's reaction to the perceived marketabil-
ity risk is entirely rational and consistent with a theoretical model
for determining when society's resources should be committed to a
long-term investment in an uncertain market environment.' 6 At
this point, however, theory departs from fact in two significant re-
spects.
First, as discussed in Part IV, the low priority consumer is not
asked to commit to purchase the gas at marginal cost. These con-
sumers are offered the supply at a price that exceeds the marginal
cost by the amount that the incremental rate, calculated using the
FPC's formula, requires low priority consumers to bear a portion of
the sunk costs of transporting and distributing gas. Second, the
major potential benefit of committing to purchase the supply under
a long-term contract- assurance of continuity of supply-is re-
moved from consideration because of the "curtailable" nature of the
supply. The low priority consumer knows that it will have access to
the gas from the proposed project, even at a price in excess of mar-
ginal cost, only as long as gas supplies from other sources are ade-
quate to meet high priority demand. With gas supplies from other
sources dwindling rapidly and excess demand from high priority
consumers predictable because of the subsidized rates applicable to
high priority consumers under the FPC's version of incremental
pricing, the industrial consumer can predict with certainty that it
will not have access to the incrementally priced gas during shortage
periods when it most values the gas. An industrial consumer also
will be required to pay a price in excess of marginal cost during
periods of temporary market equilibrium when it does not need the
gas.' 27 In the inelegant but accurate words of one witness who was
126. Investors necessarily confront a great many risks in putting money into any pro-
ject, and the likelihood of occurrence of many of these risks is subject to a high degree of
uncertainty. Because the capital available for investment is limited, to select the projects
which will go forward, someone must decide which projects offer the most attractive combina-
tion of potential costs and benefits, taking into account the probability that each risk will or
will not occur. The "someone" could be either a government agency or private investor.
Although we have chosen to permit the government to exercise some degree of indirect control
over investment decisions, we generally have chosen to permit private investors to decide how
society's limited capital should be allocated among competing projects. The assumption is
that because the private investor's profits and losses depend upon the accuracy of his fore-
casts of costs and benefits, he has the greatest incentive to make accurate forecasts as a
predicate to his investment decisions. Of course, the extent to which this practice allocates
scarce capital to the projects that are *most beneficial to society depends upon the extent to
which the societal costs and benefits associated with each project are internalized to the
investor. See Part VI(C)(3) infra.
127. No matter how certain the prospect for a gas shortage in the long term, there
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asked to react to the choice presented by an incrementally priced,
take-or-pay-for contract subject to curtailment, a customer "would
have to be a sucker to buy it.""'
Of course, this explains only why low priority consumers and
their distributor suppliers would be unwilling to commit to purchase
a new gas supply subject to incremental pricing and curtailment.
The question might be asked: Cannot the financial community ob-
tain the marketability assurances it requires through long-term pur-
chase commitments by distributors who serve principally high
priority consumers? These parties would not share the low priority
consumer's fear of diversion of gas to other consumers, and most
major new gas supply projects are supported with projections of
supply and demand that indicate that substantial service curtail-
ment to residential and commercial uses of natural gas will exist in
the early to mid-1980's unless the project is authorized. 9 Because
the gas obtained from the project is subject to diversion through the
operation of a pipeline curtailment plan, the distributor has no
incentive to commit to purchase the supply for the benefit of its high
priority customers. If the distributor commits to purchase the sup-
ply under an incrementally priced, take-or-pay-for contract, it is
obligated to buy gas under the contract despite the varying condi-
tions of supply and demand that will exist over the typical twenty-
year contract period. This undoubtedly will encompass periods in
which the distributor's residential customers would be curtailed if
the new supply were not developed, and periods in which the dis-
tributor is unable to market the gas to anyone at its incremental
price.'3 Thus, committing to a long-term purchase contract for an
incrementally priced supply creates significant marketability risks
for the distributor. These risks can be avoided by not committing
to purchase the supply and letting other distributors take the mar-
ketability risk. The distributor can rely upon the curtailment mech-
anisms to provide enough gas from other distributors who do make
long-term commitments to permit it to meet its high priority re-
quirements during the periods in which the distributor's supply of
low-priced pipeline gas is insufficient to meet its high priority re-
always will be periods in which supply temporarily exceeds demand. The demand for gas
fluctuates dramatically even in the short run because of changes in temperature, but the
supply cannot vary in such an erratic manner because of limited storage facilities and techni-
cal limitations on temporary cessation of gas production at the wellhead.
128. Tenneco Atlantic Pipeline Co., FPC No. CP 77-100, at 808.
129. See, e.g., Trunkline LNG Co., Urn. L. REP. 11,970, at 12,422-23 (forecasting 25%
curtailment of residential uses on the Trunkline system by the mid-1980's, even if LNG
imports are approved).
130. See note 127 supra.
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quirements. In other words, the combination of incremental pricing
and diversion through the curtailment mechanism creates a classic
"free rider" situation-high priority consumers and their suppliers
believe that they can obtain all the benefits resulting from the de-
velopment of an expensive new gas supply without assuming any of
the risks inherent in a long-term commitment to purchase the sup-
ply, while low priority consumers and their distributor suppliers are
reluctant to commit to long-term purchase contracts because of the
likelihood that the free riders will obtain most of the benefits of their
purchase commitment.
The net result of the disassociation of risks, costs, and benefits
that occurs under incremental pricing subject to curtailment is that
no class of consumers or distributors is willing to make long-term
purchase commitments for gas obtained from a new supply project,
even if each class of consumer and distributor concludes that a long-
term commitment to purchase a portion of the output of the project
would be in its best interest absent governmental intervention
through the curtailment mechanism. Thus, the contention of gas
pipelines and distributors that incremental pricing of supplemental
supplies subject to curtailment would destroy the financial viability
of both good and bad gas supply projects is credible.
B. Incremental Pricing Not Subject to Curtailment
To a point the rate design-curtailment mechanism adopted in
Opinion No. 622-A should produce results analogous to those antici-
pated from Opinions No. 622 and No. 796. Selective incremental
pricing combined with an assurance that gas purchased under long-
term supply contracts will not be diverted to others through the
curtailment mechanism should have allocative effects on the con-
sumption side almost identical to incremental pricing subject to
curtailment. To the extent that high priority consumers are per-
mitted unlimited access to gas at prices significantly below mar-
ginal cost, they will engage in overconsumption, assuming that their
demand for gas is not perfectly inelastic.'31 To the extent that low
priority consumers are permitted to purchase gas only at a price in
excess of marginal cost (through the inclusion of sunk costs in the
FPC's erroneous calculation of incremental price), they will con-
sume less natural gas and more of other commodities than is eco-
nomically optimal. As in the case of incremental pricing subject to
curtailment, it is impossible to determine whether allocative effi-
131. As discussed in notes 112 & 114 supra, elasticity studies indicate that residential
demand for natural gas is not inelastic in the long term. It, however, appears to be more
elastic than industrial and commercial demand.
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ciency on the consumption side will be enhanced or reduced because
of this change in rate design from the present average cost rate
design, but it is clear that resources still will be suboptimally allo-
cated.
Theoretically, the tying of risks to benefits through the assur-
ance that gas purchased under separate incrementally priced rate
schedules will not be diverted should decrease or eliminate the tend-
ency of incremental pricing to destroy the financial viability of eco-
nomically desirable gas supply projects. Assuming that the method
of calculating incremental price were modified to eliminate the in-
clusion of sunk costs, a consumer could evaluate the cost of the
supply, the risks unique to the particular supply, and the benefits
of obtaining access to a relatively secure long-term supply source,
and then make its decision to purchase or not to purchase the supply
based upon its assessment of the costs, risks, and benefits of this
supply versus all alternative means of accommodating its long-term
requirements for fuel. If enough consumers (and/or their distributor-
suppliers) committed to purchase the gas under long-term con-
tracts, the financial community would be willing to put its funds at
risk, and the project would have passed a valid market test of its
economic viability. If no consumers or distributors were willing to
commit to purchase the supply under these conditions, the financial
community would be unwilling to invest in the project, but this
would indicate merely that the project is not economically desirable
because consumers found that the combination of costs, risks, and
benefits associated with alternate means of meeting their needs
were more attractive. Thus, in theory incremental pricing not sub-
ject to curtailment would improve allocative efficiency on the pro-
duction and investment side.
The validity of this theoretical method of reintroducing rational
resource allocation on the production side of the gas industry de-
pends on the accuracy of two critical assumptions. First, the theory
would operate in the desired manner only if the incremental price
at which the gas could be purchased were calculated correctly, with-
out inclusion of sunk costs. Since any regulatory agency presumably
is capable of distinguishing between sunk costs and variable or
avoidable costs, it is reasonable to assume that the calculation of
incremental price would be performed correctly once the error in the
FPC's initial method of calculation was identified. The second as-
sumption is more troublesome. The theory would work properly only
if the assurance that the supply would not be subject to diversion
through curtailment were credible to the consumers and distribu-
tors who must make the decision to commit or not to commit to
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purchase the supply. If the potential purchasers do not find the
regulatory agency's assurance of noncurtailment credible, the disas-
sociation of risks and benefits that results in the conclusion that
incremental pricing subject to curtailment would undermine the
financial viability of economically desirable projects returns.
For the FPC or any other regulatory agency to give a credible
assurance that any gas supply purchased today would not be subject
to future diversion to benefit higher priority consumers would be
very difficult, and applying incremental pricing only to low priority
consumers would virtually assure future direct governmental inter-
diction of supplies. Curtailment of gas supplies, including curtail-
ment of gas purchased under contracts that prohibit curtailment,
has become a routine event in the gas industry.'32 The Federal Power
Commission and its successor have the power to require curtailment
of gas service, notwithstanding provisions in contracts forbidding
curtailment, in order to insure that high priority consumers do not
experience supply interruptions. 33 Even if the FPC were willing to
give assurances that it would not divert gas supplies purchased
under incremental rate schedules,' 34 it could not bind future com-
missions by giving such an assurance. As the Commission recog-
nized in Opinion No. 796-A:
In a related matter, the Commission agrees that it cannot in this proceeding,
ensure that future commissions or successor regulatory authorities, would
never curtail the gas sold under separate incremental rate schedules. We also
agree that the eventual curtailment of this LNG supply, under purportedly
"non-curtailable" rate schedules, has been a major factor in the apparent
reluctance of parties to sign 20-year contracts with take-or-pay provisions for
the purchase of LNG.'3 1
Thus it is apparent that as long as potential purchasers believe that
high priority consumers will require access to incrementally priced
supplemental supplies of gas in order to avoid future service inter-
ruptions, no regulatory agency can provide credible assurances that
gas purchased under separate incremental rate schedules will not be
diverted.
The potential for future diversion of supplies is important only
132. Curtailments of "firm" service have increased every year since 1970. NATURAL GAS
HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 3. In 1976-77, curtailments of "firm" service occurred on 31
interstate pipeline systems, with aggregate curtailment amounting to 23% of total "firm"
requirements. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, supra note 5.
133. FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. at 646-47.
134. At least since its 1972 decision in Columbia LNG Corp., 96 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR)
389, the Commission has been unwilling to assure that a gas supply will be available on a
firm, noncurtailable basis. See, e.g., Columbia LNG Corp., UTIL. L. REP. 11,894, at 14,370.
135. Trunkline LNG Corp., UTIL. L. REP. 11,970, at 12,443.
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if the demand for gas for high priority uses will exceed the supply
of gas that is not subject to the long-term incrementally priced
contracts. If future supply shortfalls will be infrequent or nonexis-
tent, the theoretical risk of diversion will not weigh heavily in the
decisions of potential purchasers. To determine the extent to which
the theoretical potential for diversion should be considered a realis-
tic risk, one must return to the manner in which selective incremen-
tal pricing would affect decisions at the point of consumption. Be-
cause high priority consumers would be provided access to gas at a
price substantially less than marginal cost under even a properly
calculated selective incremental pricing system, the demand for gas
by such consumers would increase over time. With incremental ad-
ditions to total gas supply tied up under long-term, noncurtailable
contracts and the volume of old gas flowing from traditional infra-
marginal sources continuing its inevitable decline, regulatory agen-
cies soon would face again the choice of permitting service interrup-
tions to high priority consumers or diverting gas purchased under
noncurtailable contracts. The outcome of that decision, at least in
our political system, always is going to be the same. Thus, when
political realism and the operation of the rate design at the point of
consumption are interjected into the analysis, a system of selective
incremental pricing with no curtailment becomes, on analysis,
identical in actual impact to a system of selective incremental pric-
ing subject to curtailment.
C. Incremental Pricing up to the Price of Alternate Fuels
The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 requires interstate pipelines
to allocate most costs of acquiring gas that exceed $1.42 per MCF
exclusively to low priority consumers and to distributors that serve
low priority consumers. 3 ' This basic formula, however, operates
only to the point at which the price that the low priority consumer
must pay for gas equals the price of No. 2 fuel oil. 3 ' Presumably,
once this ceiling is reached, the pipeline and/or regulatory agency
is free to return to the traditional average cost method of allocating
energy costs. 3 " To determine the origin and putative purpose of this
proposed method of apportioning costs through rate design is diffi-
cult. Because this approach would provide no meaningful potential
for enhanced allocative efficiency and only a temporary and modest
distributional impact among gas consumers and distributors, the
136. Pub. L. No. 95-621, §§ 201-208.
137. Id. § 204(c)(3)(B).
138. Id. § 204(d)(2).
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best guess is that it is simply an unprincipled but expedient com-
promise between advocates of retention of average cost pricing and
advocates of incremental pricing.
In the short term this compromise approach to the rate design
issue would produce consumption patterns similar to an approach
using incremental pricing subject to curtailment. High priority con-
sumers, faced with rates even farther below marginal cost than rates
calculated using average cost methods, would consume more gas
than they should. Low priority consumers confronting, at least tem-
porarily, rates in excess of marginal cost 139 would consume less gas
and more substitutes than they should. In addition, in the short
term, distributors and the state commissions that regulate them
probably would engage in a series of rapid, ad hoc efforts to reallo-
cate distributor fixed costs among classes of consumers in order to
minimize the total cost of obtaining gas that the distribution system
and/or the state must pay the interstate pipelines. Any distributor
serving at least one low priority consumer could escape the burden
of paying a disproportionately high price for the gas purchased from
a pipeline to serve that consumer as soon as the low priority con-
sumer's rate for gas equals or exceeds the price of alternate fuels.
Consequently, the distributor and the state commission regulating
the distributor would have a clear common interest in taking actions
that would cause the rate of the low priority consumer to reach the
price of substitute fuels as rapidly as possible. This could be accom-
plished easily by redesigning the distributor's rates to ensure that
all low priority consumers pay a rate equal to the price of alternate
fuels regardless of the price that the distributor must pay for pipe-
line gas to serve the consumer-by imposing a disproportionate
share of the fixed or joint costs of distribution on the low priority
consumer.
The period of time in which low priority consumers face a rate
at least equal to marginal cost under this method of allocating costs
will be very short indeed. Given the price at which new gas supplies
can be obtained today,'40 the inclusion of sunk costs in the rates of
low priority consumers,"' and the price of No. 2 fuel oil, all low
priority consumers soon will be paying a rate equal to the price of
139. The rates applicable to low priority consumers can exceed marginal cost because
the rates of low priority consumers under the bills would consist of the marginal cost of gas
at the point of initial acquisition, plus the average cost of transporting and distributing gas.
See Part V(A) supra.
140. The prices for new gas range from $1.75 to over $5.00 per MCF. See text accompa-
nying notes 25-28 supra.
141. See Part V(A) supra.
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alternative fuels. 1 2 At this point the ceiling in the statutory provi-
sion will be triggered and the pipelines, distributors, and regulatory
agencies are free to return to average-cost pricing. All that will be
accomplished is a slight acceleration of the present trend of gas rates
for low priority consumers to equal or exceed the price of alternative
fuels.' Because demand by most natural gas consumers is almost
perfectly inelastic up to (and somewhat above) the price of alterna-
tive fuels,' no long-term changes in allocative efficiency on the
consumption side can be anticipated. The return to average cost
pricing once the statutory ceiling on incremental pricing is reached
also would eliminate any potential for enhancing allocative effi-
ciency in decisions to develop new gas supply projects, would leave
the bargaining powers of pipelines and producers seriously skewed,
and would eliminate any potential for permitting market forces to
replace administrative allocation in clearing the natural gas market.
In short, the modifications in natural gas rate design mandated in
the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 will produce exactly the same
set of problems that are inherent in the present rate design. Further
changes in rate designs are essential to bring health back to the
chronically ill natural gas market.
VI. PROMISING APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM
Conceptually, the cure for the seriously maladjusted natural
gas market is easy to state. The pricing system must confront each
consumer with the marginal cost of natural gas service and must
replace the curtailment mechanism by clearing the gas market au-
tomatically. Such a pricing system would assure efficient allocation
of resources on both the production and consumption sides, elimi-
nate the high transaction costs and rigidities associated with admin-
istering curtailments, provide strong incentives for pipelines and
distributors to bargain for the lowest price supply that they can
obtain, and permit a reduction in the delay and transaction costs
inherent in the present method of government review of proposed
new gas supply projects.
142. The range of prices that industrial consumers paid for fuel oil in January 1976 was$1.90 to $2.30 per MCF equivalent. FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 23, at 68.
143. The rates applicable to industrial consumers of natural gas have been projected
to exceed the price of fuel oil in two regions by 1981 and in all regions by 1985 if present rate
designs are retained. LNG FAcT BOOK, supra note 5, at 29.
144. Natural gas is a perfect substitute for oil in almost all applications, and its precise
flame geometry and clean burning characteristics cause consumers who can burn either
natural gas or oil to prefer natural gas. The amount of the premium a consumer will pay to
use natural gas rather than oil depends upon the consumer's circumstances, particularly the
way in which the gas will be used.
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The adoption of a "pure" marginal cost pricing system145 in the
natural gas industry, however, is inconsistent with two other goals
of the regulatory process. First, implicit in the present system for
regulating producer prices is the goal of limiting the excess rents
that could be obtained through production of old gas at inframar-
ginal costs and its sale at prices based upon marginal cost.'" The
retention of price controls on most old gas in the producer pricing
provisions of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 indicates that this
goal is likely to be an enduring one. The adoption of full marginal
cost pricing at the producer sale level is inconsistent with this goal.
Second, because natural gas pipelines and distributors share many
of the characteristics of a classic natural monopoly, a major goal of
the regulatory system is to limit the revenues that can be earned by
these companies. Since it appears that this goal is unlikely to be
abandoned in the near future, full marginal cost pricing cannot be
effectuated at the wholesale or retail level except in the wholly
fortuitous (and presently rare) situation in which the pipeline or
distributor's marginal cost equals its average cost.'47 In the typical
case, marginal cost exceeds average cost, and adoption of pure mar-
ginal cost pricing at the wholesale or retail level will result in reve-
nues to the pipeline or distributor that exceed those that society
desires to allow.' 48
At least three possible methods of structuring natural gas rates
can accommodate the constraints of limiting pipeline and distribu-
tor monopoly profits and limiting producer rents on inframarginal
production, and simultaneously eliminate or greatly reduce the
problems inherent in the present methods of interrelating costs and
145. Pure marginal cost pricing refers to the setting of all rates for natural gas at
marginal cost.
146. See note 33 supra.
147. Of course, when marginal cost equals average cost, it is relatively easy to switch
to marginal cost pricing because this can be accomplished by reallocating costs from one class
of consumers to another without worrying about methods of accommodating the revenue
constraint.
148. Average cost possibly could exceed marginal cost in a few isolated areas today. See
RATE DESIGN, supra note 15, ch. 10 § 5, at 2 (suggesting that gas rates in New England exceed
marginal cost). Where this is the case, adoption of marginal cost pricing, through the process
of establishing maximum rates based upon marginal cost, would reduce the rate of return
earned by the distributor or pipeline below the rate that would otherwise be permitted. In
this situation mandatory marginal cost pricing should be imposed only if it is accompanied
by a subsidy to the regulated company that offsets the earnings deficit. Failure to permit
investors to earn a rate of return on investments that have become sunk costs of the enterprise
will deter future investments in the fixed assets of an industry subject to direct economic
regulation. See D. Boias & P. VERKUIL, PUBLIC CONTROL OF BUSINESS 419-20 (1977). Of course,
requiring a company to charge a rate in excess of marginal cost through the use of minimum
rates raises quite different considerations.
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prices. For convenience these methods will be referred to as inclin-
ing block rates, marginal cost pricing with consumer rebates, and
marginal cost pricing with an excess profits tax. Each of these meth-
ods presents both problems of implementation unique to it and
problems shared with the other two possible methods. None of the
problems, however, is insurmountable, and the adoption of any of
the three methods could improve the operation of the natural gas
market, while establishing conditions in which the wellhead rate for
new gas could be deregulated without significant risk of undesirable
transfers of wealth from consumers to producers.
Because each of these three viable approaches to the natural
gas pricing problem relies heavily upon an accurate calculation of
marginal cost, the following discussion begins with a broad concep-
tual method of identifying marginal costs and assigning those costs
to the appropriate consumer or class of consumers. This will be
followed by a description of each of the three methods of employing
marginal costs in natural gas pricing, the problems unique to each,
and potential means of eliminating or reducing those problems.
Finally, problems potentially shared by all three methods of inte-
grating marginal cost into the rate structure will be identified and
discussed.
A. Identifying and Assigning the Marginal Costs of Natural Gas
Service
Marginal costs are simply those avoidable costs that are in-
curred in order to provide one more unit of a good or service.' Thus,
each major element of cost that goes into the calculation of natural
gas rates must be analyzed to determine whether it should be in-
cluded in the marginal cost calculation, and, if so, whether it is a
cost common to all consumers or unique to a particular group of
consumers.
The first major element is the cost of purchasing the gas from
a producer, importer, or manufacturer. 5 0 This clearly is an avoida-
149. Because of indivisibilities in the factors of production and the need to adopt meth-
ods of calculating rates that are relatively easy to implement administratively, marginal cost,
in the strict sense of the avoidable costs of producing one more unit, makes little sense as a
rate standard. Rather, an easily calculated approximation of marginal cost should be used.
One sensible approach that would implement marginal cost pricing principles without intro-
ducing unnecessary complications into the rate-setting process would be to use as a surrogate
for marginal energy cost the average cost of the most expensive 10% of the pipeline or
distributor's total gas supply. The dilution of marginal cost pricing resulting from the use of
such a surrogate would be slight, and the reduction in transaction costs would be significant.
150. Because of the OPEC cartel, the marginal cost of producing natural gas may differ
significantly from the pipeline's marginal cost of acquiring natural gas in the form of imported
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ble cost and should be included fully in the calculation of the mar-
ginal cost of serving each consumer. But for each consumer's pur-
chase of gas, the pipeline or distributor could avoid incurring the
cost of purchasing the last unit of gas.
Determining the appropriate classification of the myriad costs
that previously have gone under the broad heading of capacity costs
in the traditional Seaboard formula for establishing two-part rates
requires identification of the principal components of capacity costs
and analysis of each. The first major component of capacity costs
is the cost of the equipment such as pipes and valves through which
gas is transported and distributed. With one significant exception,
these costs should not be included in the calculation of marginal
cost. The conditions that justified the use of the two-part rate with
a separate charge for capacity costs based upon responsibility for
peak-period capacity no longer exist, at least for the vast bulk of the
physical plant investment required to transport and distribute
gas. '151 The gas pipeline and distribution industry, like the railroad
LNG. For instance, the marginal cost of producing natural gas in Algeria may be as low as
$0.25 per MCF, but Algeria's market power from its membership in a price-fixing cartel may
permit it to charge in excess of $1.00 per MCF for its gas production (ignoring the very high
costs of cryogenic processing and transportation). Because the United States has no control
over this overstating of marginal resource cost, the relevant marginal cost for rate-making
purposes should be the marginal cost to the pipeline of acquiring the gas-this also represents
the marginal cost to the United States economy. See Kahn, The Economics of Regulation:
Externalities and Institutional Issues, 101 PuB. UTm. FORT. 23, 24 (Feb. 2, 1978).
151. The basic justification for the two-part rate is that consumers whose demand for
a product or service at a time when the fixed assets required to produce that product or service
are fully utilized should be required to pay the capacity costs. If the consumers who are
responsible for the industry's capacity are not required to pay a rate that reflects the cost of
that capacity, more consumers will demand the product or service during the period in which
the present capacity is fully utilized. This, in turn, will result in expansion of the industry's
capacity, but the need for capacity expansion will have resulted from increased demand
induced by a price that does not reflect the costs of present capacity, much less the cost of
an expansion in capacity. See generally 1 A. KAHN, supra note 20, at 87-122; R. POSNER, supra
note 53, § 12.5.
For most of the fixed assets required to transport and distribute natural gas, just as for
some of the fixed assets of the railroads (mainly roadbed), there is no realistic danger that
failure to reflect capacity costs in rates will result in a false price signal to consumers that in
turn, will result in unjustified investment in increased capacity. This is because there is
substantial excess capacity in both the gas transportation and distribution industry and in
the railroad industry, and there is no foreseeable set of future circumstances in which the
capacity of either industry will be fully utilized. Thus, the capacity costs of transporting and
distributing gas should be considered sunk costs and should not be reflected in individual
consumers' rates. Exclusion of sunk capacity costs from the calculation of unit rates will have
the salutory effect of encouraging maximum utilization of existing capacity. See R. POSNER,
supra note 53, § 12.5, at 262-63; Kahn, supra note 105, at 12-13.
This is not to say that the regulated company should not be allowed to recover its sunk
costs if market conditions permit it to do so. See note 148 supra. Under present conditions in
the natural gas industry, the rate to consumers can be based upon marginal cost, excluding
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industry, is now typified by substantial and chronic excess capacity.
The physical plant is unlikely to require expansion even in the long
term, and it has little if any value for purposes other than transport-
ing natural gas.' 2 Consequently, it should be treated as a sunk cost
or a free good in calculating the marginal cost of providing gas
service. The significant exception to the exclusion of physical plant
costs from the calculation of marginal costs is when the investment
obviously is not a sunk cost, as when the pipeline or distributor
installs new pipe. Given chronic excess capacity, this is most likely
to happen in one of two circumstances: (1) when new pipe is in-
stalled in order to attach a new supply, or (2) when new pipe is
required to serve new customers. In the first instance, the costs of
the physical plant should be included as a component of the mar-
ginal cost of the new supply. In the second case, the costs should
be included in the calculation of the marginal cost of serving the
new customers. To avoid the appearance of inequity in the rate
structure and the complexity of many different rates for consumers
with similar consumption characteristics, the second class of new
physical plant costs should be recovered through the imposition of
a one-time connection charge, '53 rather than through the unit rate
charged to the new customer.
Capacity costs traditionally have included some variable costs
as well as fixed costs of physical plant. An obvious example is the
fuel required to transport gas through a pipeline or distribution
system. The marginal cost calculation should encompass all such
avoidable costs, even those previously included under the label ca-
pacity costs.
Costs such as billing and metering, which traditionally have
been referred to as customer costs in gas distributor ratemaking, are
almost entirely avoidable and should be included in the calculation
of the marginal cost of serving each class of customer. Since these
costs vary depending upon the characteristics of the customer, but
do not vary directly with the volume of gas used by a particular
customer, they should be recovered through a separate charge on
each customer's bill reflecting the administrative costs of serving
that class of customer.
the sunk costs of transportation and distribution capacity, and yet the revenue requirements
of the pipelines and distributors can include these sunk capacity costs because the marginal
cost of supplying gas to consumers exceeds the average cost in almost all cases.
152. See note 117 supra.
153. The Wisconsin Public Service Commission recently has required that all new gas
customers pay a one-time connection charge reflecting the full cost of gas main extensions
required to provide the connection. Wisconsin Fuel & Light Co., No. 6640-GR-1 (Oct. 25,
1977), summarized in 101 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 51-52 (Jan. 5, 1978).
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Finally, the bulk of the costs of storing gas are avoidable and
thus should be included in the calculation of the marginal cost of
serving those customers who receive service in part through the use
of storage facilities. Quite obviously, in the typical situation of a
pipeline that injects gas into storage during the six warm months
of the year for withdrawal during the six cold months, the costs of
storing gas should not be imposed throughout the year. The most
appropriate treatment of storage costs is recovery through imposi-
tion of a storage cost surcharge on all gas consumed during the
period in which gas is being withdrawn from storage. 54 This will
place the benefits and costs of storage on the same group of consum-
ers, and market forces could be relied upon to produce the optimal
expenditure on storage.To summarize briefly, the marginal cost of serving each con-
sumer would consist of: (1) the cost of acquiring the highest priced
gas supply purchased by the supplier, including the cost of install-
ing new facilities to transport that supply; (2) the avoidable costs
of transporting and distributing the supply; (3) the cost of addi-
tional distribution capacity required to serve a new customer, re-
covered in the form of a one-time attachment fee; (4) the adminis-
trative costs of providing service to each customer, recovered in the
form of a separately stated charge on each bill; and (5) the cost of
storing gas, imposed as a surcharge on the bill of each consumer
receiving gas during periods in which gas is being withdrawn from
storage.
B. Three Methods of Implementing Marginal Cost Pricing
The following discussion of three potential methods of reflect-
ing marginal cost principles in setting natural gas rates proceeds
analytically on the assumption that the distributor's rates must
reflect its marginal cost. This approach is taken because it is easier
to illustrate the effect of marginal cost pricing on the retail level
than on the wholesale level. In fact, to obtain the desired effect, the
rates of both pipelines and distributors must be based upon mar-
ginal cost. To illustrate this fact, consider the typical distributor
that purchases gas from a pipeline at a rate of $0.60 per MCF based
on the pipeline's average costs. If the pipeline's method of calculat-
ing its rates is not changed to reflect its marginal cost, the distribu-
tor's marginal cost of gas is only $0.60 per MCF. Yet, if the pipeline
154. Similarly, the costs associated with the operation of peak-shaving facilities should
be recovered through a surcharge applicable only to those customers that receive service
during the periods in which the peak-shaving facilities are in use.
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is purchasing gas at costs varying from $0.20 to $2.00 per MCF, its
marginal cost and the distributor's actual marginal cost is $2.00 per
MCF, not $0.60 per MCF. Thus, optimal allocative efficiency can
be assured only if both distributors and pipelines adopt methods of
determining rates that reflect marginal cost.
(1) Inclining Block Rates
Consistent with the desire to limit pipeline and distributor rev-
enues and to limit producer rents on inframarginal production, one
method of achieving many of the goals of marginal cost pricing is
to establish for each consumer, or class of consumers, an inverted
rate form in which the consumer confronts the marginal cost of gas
in the last consumption block. The initial units of gas consumed by
any customer would have to be priced substantially below marginal
cost (and even below average cost) for this rate structure to be
consistent with the desire to limit pipeline, distributor, and produ-
cer revenues.' The price of successive units purchased would in-
crease gradually until the price reached marginal cost in the tail-
block of the rate form.
The principle supporting the adoption of inverted rates is that
every consumer values the last unit of a good purchased at less than
the value he placed on the prior unit. Thus, at least in theory, if the
consumer is confronted with a price based upon marginal cost for
the last units of gas purchased and a price approaching marginal
cost for the immediately preceding units, he will make the same
kind of rational decision reflecting accurately the resource costs of
his options as he would make if confronted with pure marginal cost
pricing. Allocation of gas among consumers would be more efficient
because consumers who value the last units of gas at less than
marginal cost will forego consumption. Moreover, pipelines and dis-
tributors will face the risk that there will be insufficient demand for
gas in the marginal cost tailblock of each rate form to permit them
to sell their entire gas supply. This will force them to pay no more
for a new gas supply than the value placed on the supply by each
consumer and to engage in tough negotiations and shopping for new
gas supplies.
The inverted rate would perform best in shaping decisions by
sophisticated consumers on whether to purchase the last units of gas
155. This assumes that the pipeline or distributor is in the situation most common in
the gas industry today in which marginal cost exceeds average cost. In the presently rare
situation in which average cost exceeds marginal cost, the revenue constraint requires either
the use of average-cost pricing or some form of subsidy combined with marginal cost pricing.
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available or to pay for substitutes such as insulation and more effi-
cient combustion equipment, which would reduce their consump-
tion of gas and remove them from the last blocks of the rate form.
Unfortunately, many gas consumers are not sophisticated enough to
base their decision on the unit cost of gas that they confront in the
final consumption block, and many decisions to purchase or forego
purchasing gas are based properly upon the average cost of gas to
the consumer, rather than the cost of obtaining the last units con-
sumed.
There is some evidence, which seems to be consistent with cas-
ual empirical observation, that most residential gas consumers have
no idea how much they pay for each unit of gas they purchase or
how their gas bill is calculated. They are aware only of the total
amount of the bill; consequently, they decide whether to purchase
a unit of gas on the basis of the average cost of the gas.'58 Because
the average cost of gas to consumers would be unaltered by the
inverted rate form, the consumption patterns of this large group of
unsophisticated consumers would not be altered. Of course, educat-
ing residential gas consumers in the manner in which their bills are
calculated could result in better informed decisions by these con-
sumers, and to the extent that educational efforts were successful,
inclining block rates would result in a more efficient allocation of
gas. Gas distributors probably would not assist voluntarily in such
an educational effort,' 57 but they could be compelled to assist in that
effort by regulatory commissions. In addition, other groups, such as
manufacturers of insulation and electrical ignition systems, would
have an interest in assisting the public to understand the implica-
tions of inverted rates. Even the best-designed system of educating
residential consumers concerning the characteristics of inclining
block rates, however, would meet only partial success.
Another serious problem with the inclining block rate is that
many decisions among alternative purchases or investments are
made properly on the basis of average cost. For instance, for two
decisions that arise frequently for natural gas consumers-the deci-
sion to install initially natural gas burning equipment in a residence
and the decision to convert a major unit of combustion equipment
from gas to another fuel-the inclining block characteristic and the
existence of a tailblock rate equal to marginal cost are irrelevant.
156. See Consumer Energy Project, New Hampshire Legal Assistance, New Hampshire
Energy Usage Patterns and Consumer Orientation (1976).
157. A gas distributor obviously has no incentive to make consumers aware of the high
price of marginal units of consumption because consumer awareness can only increase the
distributor's marketability risk.
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Because these decisions would continue to be made on the basis of
average cost calculations that are unaffected by the way in which
costs vary from one consumption block to another, these decisions
would continue to be made on the basis of gas prices that are under-
stated in terms of the resources required to produce and deliver gas.
Thus, while inverted rates would increase the allocative efficiency
of the gas market in some respects, they would leave unaffected
many of the characteristics of the market that produce the present
suboptimal allocation of resources.
Moreover, the inclining block approach almost certainly would
increase the transaction costs inherent in pipeline and distributor
rate cases by introducing major new issues on which the parties
would have conflicting interests and strong incentives to litigate.
These issues are not susceptible to resolution through the consistent
application of neutral principles founded in reason. For instance,
how many different classes of consumers should be identified sepa-
rately and subjected to a common rate schedule? What dividing
points should be used to distinguish consumers subject to one rate
schedule from consumers subject to another rate schedule? What
degree of upward taper should be imposed for each class of
consumer?' 8 These transaction costs could be expected to decline
over time as a set of relatively settled rules governing each new area
of controversy is developed by regulatory authorities. The partial
improvement in allocative efficiency resulting from adoption of in-
clining block rates may justify increased transaction costs, but the
case in support of inverted rates for gas distributors is far from clear.
As a potential method of adopting marginal cost pricing principles,
the inverted rate offers more promise at the wholesale or pipeline
level than at the distribution level.1 59
158. Since the goal of the inclining block rate is to confront each consumer with a price
based upon marginal cost for the last units of gas purchased, the ideal rate structure would
use a different rate curve fcr each consumer reflecting that consumer's individual consump-
tion characteristics. Such a structure, however, would be far too complex to establish and
administer. At a minimum, classes of consumers with relatively common consumption char-
acteristics would have to be established. Dilution of the impact of the marginal cost tailblock
would inevitably result because some consumers in each class could increase their consump-
tion without reaching the marginal cost tailblock. Moreover, consumers who are likely to be
confronted with decisions based upon average cost-decisions to install initially natural gas
combustion equipment or to convert existing combustion equipment to other fuels-should
confront a rate curve that produces an average cost of gas approaching marginal cost. Yet
the effort to confront these consumers with an average cost approaching marginal cost neces-
sarily makes the task of confronting each consumer with the marginal cost of the last unit of
gas consumed much more difficult if the pricing scheme remains consistent with revenue
constraints. The solution to the problem is largely indeterminate, and protracted litigation
between parties with substantial sums of money at stake would be inevitable.
159. The customers of an interstate pipeline typically have characteristics that differ
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(2) Marginal Cost Pricing with Consumer Rebates
The second potential modification of pure marginal cost pricing
that could be implemented consistent with revenue constraints pro-
duces a very simple basic rate structure. Marginal cost is calculated
for each class of customers, and each unit of gas purchased by each
consumer is priced at marginal cost. The resulting excessive reve-
nues generated by the distributor are returned to consumers in the
form of rebates. As long as the rebates have no relationship to the
volume of gas consumed by the customer, the rebates should not
affect the consumer's behavior.10 With consumer behavior guided
entirely by marginal cost, all the problems inherent in the present
rate structure should be eliminated. Only those gas supply projects
that can yield gas at a cost less than or equal to the value that
consumers place on natural gas will be undertaken. Distributors and
pipeline suppliers will have proper incentives to bargain for the
lowest cost supply available. The gas market will clear automati-
cally, thereby cptimizing the efficient allocation of gas among con-
sumers and eliminating the transaction costs of administering the
curtailment system.
The potentially significant limitations unique to this method of
adopting marginal cost pricing emerge only through analysis of the
manner in which the rebate is likely to be distributed to the con-
sumer. The reason for the rebate is to return to the consumer the
gains of regulating pipelines, distributors, and producers without
dramatically from the characteristics of a distributor's customers. A pipeline usually provides
service to relatively few large distribution customers and large industrial customers. The
pipeline's customers are sophisticated enough and have enough at stake in the transaction
that they are intimately familiar with the basis on which they are billed. Consequently, there
is no potential for confusing average cost and marginal cost as the basis for billing the last
units of gas purchased. Also, the distributor customers have no realistic means of entirely
substituting another fuel for natural gas. Thus, there is no basis for concern that they will
make decisions based upon their average cost of gas. Applying an inclining block rate to the
pipeline's industrial customers could present problems, since many of them may be able
through conversion to substitute entirely other fuels for natural gas. However, because the
rates charged by interstate pipelines to direct industrial customers are not subject to regula-
tion under the Natural Gas Act, the pipeline would have an automatic incentive to base the
contract rate applicable to such customers upon marginal cost without any encouragement
from regulatory authorities. Thus, inverted rates with a tailblock equal to marginal cost may
well provide the easiest and most effective means of implementing marginal cost pricing
principles at the pipeline level.
160. It would be more technically accurate to state that a rebate that has no relation-
ship to volume will have no effect upon consumer behavior in terms of a consumer's prefer-
ence for one good over another-the substitution effect. To the extent that the rebate in-
creases each consumer's disposable income, it will produce increased consumption of all goods
by the consumer through the income effect. The income effect of the rebate, however, is of
no concern in attempting to obtain an efficient allocation of resources.
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affecting the consumer's behavior. To accomplish this, the rebate
must have no relationship to the amount of gas consumed by an
individual customer, and consumers must recognize that the rebate
has no relationship to their gas consumption. The first part of the
requirement may produce criteria for determining eligibility for re-
bates that are considered unacceptable on equitable grounds. For
instance, eligibility for a rebate cannot depend upon whether the
consumer is receiving gas service at the time the rebate is distrib-
uted. If potential new consumers of gas could become entitled to the
rebate by deciding to install gas service, they again would be faced
with a decision based upon average costM' rather than marginal cost,
and many consumers who value gas service at less than its cost
would choose gas service. Similarly, if historic gas consumers lost
their eligibility for a rebate by ceasing to use gas, they would base
their decision on conversion to other fuels upon the average cost of
gas,'62 rather than its marginal cost, again resulting in overconsump-
tion of gas. Thus, the principle that rebates cannot depend upon the
amount of gas used must be enforced rigidly if this pricing system
is to be effective. Whether legislators and/or regulators would be
willing to adopt a system of rebates that excluded new customers
and included old customers who are no longer receiving gas is at
least questionable. Only if they were willing to take this step would
marginal cost pricing with consumer rebates alleviate the problems
inherent in the operation of the natural gas market.
In addition to observing the crucial caveat that rebates not be
linked to present consumption, consumers would have to under-
stand that there is no relationship between the rebate and present
gas consumption. Given the high percentage of unsophisticated con-
sumers in this market, a real danger exists that consumers would
misunderstand the operation of the rebate system and base their
decisions on the mistaken assumption that the difference between
161. To illustrate, consider an individual who is building a home and is faced with the
decision to install gas or oil heat. The rate for gas service is $2.50 per MCF, while oil costs
$2.00 per MCF equivalent. The consumer should and undoubtedly will select oil heat. If the
person, however, is aware that by becoming a gas consumer he can become eligible for an
annual rebate of $100, he will offset this rebate against the unit cost of gas and will install a
gas furnace rather than an oil furnace if he uses less than 200 MCF of gas per year. His
decision once again will have been based upon the average cost of gas rather than its marginal
cost, and suboptimal allocation of resources will result.
162. This too can be illustrated best through a hypothetical. If a present gas consumer
is paying $2.50 per MCF for gas service and he can convert to oil at a cost of $2.00 per MCF
equivalent (including capital costs of conversion), he should and will convert. If, however, he
now is receiving a $100 per year rebate that he will lose once he converts, he will not convert
if he uses less than 200 MCF of gas per year. In short, the decision to convert will be made
once again on the basis of average cost rather than marginal cost.
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the amount they are billed and the amount of their rebate is their
effective cost of gas-they would base their decisions on average
cost. Here again, the ability of the rate design to change consump-
tion patterns in important sectors of the market depends upon con-
sumer education. The difference between the mechanics of a rebate
system and the mechanics of billing under an inclining block rate
schedule, however, should make consumer education substantially
easier. To test this empirically unsupported statement, consider
whether you are more likely to attempt to read and decipher a
typical utility bill or to read and understand a notice accompanying
a check that states: "Enclosed is your rebate check. It has no rela-
tionship to the price that you must pay for natural gas. Even if you
cease using all natural gas or double your consumption, your rebate
amount will be the same."
The transaction costs of adopting a system of marginal cost
pricing with consumer rebates appear quite tolerable. Essentially,
only three steps are involved. First, the utility's revenue require-
ments must be calculated. This step is identical to the first step in
all utility rate cases," 3 and therefore it does not impose any addi-
tional transaction costs. Second, the distributor's marginal cost for
each class of customers must be determined. This would require
some additional effort because agencies that regulate the natural
gas industry typically have not had occasion to calculate marginal
costs.164 As the FPC's recent abortive attempts to impose incremen-
tal pricing illustrate, some time will be required for agencies to
develop adequate methods of calculating marginal cost. Calculation
of marginal cost, however, requires merely that agencies distinguish
between avoidable costs and sunk costs-a procedure that can be
institutionalized rapidly through the Uniform System of Accounts
now used by most agencies that regulate utility rates."' The differ-
163. A regulated utility's revenue requirements typically are calculated using the for-
mula RR = E + D + (rate of return x rate base), where RR is revenue requirements, E is
expenses, D is depreciation, rate of return is the firm's estimated cost of capital, and rate
base is the value of the firm's capital assets used and useful in the regulated business. No
change in this method of calculating revenue requirements is necessary to implement mar-
ginal cost pricing with a consumer rebate or with an excess profits tax.
164. One step in the present method of setting natural gas rates-determination of the
appropriate rate design for the utility-would be eliminated by a change to marginal cost
pricing with a rebate or an excess profits tax. The reduction in transaction costs resulting
from elimination of the traditional rate design phase of the proceeding would offset all or a
substantial part of the transaction costs added by the determination of marginal cost.
165. The Federal Power Commission established a Uniform System of Accounts to
govern its regulation of electric and gas utilities in 1937, and it revises the system periodically
to reflect the introduction of new technology, new accounting techniques, and new regulatory
instruments. The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) has a
comparable uniform system. Most state regulatory commissions use one of these two similar
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ence between marginal cost times volume expected to be sold'6 and
the utility's allowed revenue requirements yields the aggregate
amount of the consumer rebate.'67
The third step in the process is to determine the criteria to be
used in apportioning the rebate among consumers. Given the
amounts of money at stake and the absence of intuitive standards
to guide the agency. in determining the allocation of the rebate
among classes of consumers, in at least the first few proceedings this
step in the rate proceeding could be expected to spark substantial
controversy. Definite limits exist, however, to the amount of time
and effort that can be put into the process of apportioning the re-
bate. Apart from the essential criterion that the rebate have no
relationship to present gas consumption, how the rebate is divided
has no effect on allocative efficiency. Indeed, the decision is one
peculiarly appropriate to the political process, and the legislature
might reasonably eliminate all transaction costs associated with
arguments concerning who gets what share of the gains of regulation
by preempting the dispute through the adoption of a statutory for-
mula.
In summary, marginal cost pricing with consumer rebates
would be an effective approach to restoring the health of the gas
market if, but only if, legislators were willing to adopt a rebate
system that did not tie in any way the eligibility or amount of a
rebate to present gas consumption. If implemented in a manner
assuring that consumers understood that no relationship existed be-
tween the rebate and present gas consumption, allocative efficiency
in all aspects of the gas industry could be substantially enhanced.
Although some additional transaction costs in rate cases could
result from adoption of this method of pricing, there clearly would
be a net reduction in the total transaction costs incurred in regulat-
ing the natural gas industry. The expensive and time-consuming
systems. This use of uniform accounting systems greatly reduces the transaction costs of
public utility regulation by permitting accounting disputes to be resolved in one or two
proceedings of general applicability, rather than through ad hoc adjudications in a multitude
of separate rate proceedings. See generally J. SuELFLow, supra note 109, at 32-56. The present
uniform system of accounts is tailored to the calculation of revenue requirements, but an
analogous system could be devised for use in calculating marginal cost.
166. Of course, the estimate of volume must be predicated upon the marginal cost rate.
167. The marginal cost rate would be a maximum rate only. There is no need to make
the marginal cost rate a minimum rate as well because basing the aggregate rebate on the
difference between marginal cost rate revenues and allowed revenue requirements will give
the utility a strong incentive to sell its gas at the highest rate approaching marginal cost that
market conditions will permit. Moreover, the power to sell gas at less than its marginal cost
provides the utility with a means of cutting its losses and avoiding in part the large fluctua-
tions in earnings that can result from errors in forecasting demand. See Part VI(C)(4) infra.
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process of overseeing the curtailment mechanism would be elimi-
nated, and proceedings to consider proposed new gas supply projects
could be truncated substantially by limiting the issues to those
involving externalities.
(3) Marginal Cost Pricing with an Excess Profits Tax
The third generic approach to implementing marginal cost
pricing in the gas industry has characteristics in common with mar-
ginal cost pricing with a consumer rebate. The distributor's unit
rate would be calculated on the basis of marginal cost, and all gas
would be sold at marginal cost, while the distributor's revenue re-
quirements would be calculated in the traditional manner. Under
this approach, however, the difference between the revenues pro-
duced by the use of marginal cost pricing and the utility's allowed
revenue requirements would be taxed instead of being rebated to
consumers.'6
The principal advantage of marginal cost pricing with an excess
profits tax is its ability to accomplish the same improvements in
allocative efficiency as theoretically are available through adoption
of marginal cost pricing with consumer rebates, while eliminating
the concern that the rebate system will be structured in a manner
that affects consumer behavior. With the difference between mar-
ginal cost revenues and average cost revenues entering the treasury
and returning to consumers in the form of tax reductions,' 9 no possi-
bility exists that consumers would misconstrue their share of the
distributed gains of regulation as an offset to their cost of gas.
The transaction costs involved in implementing marginal cost
pricing with an excess profits tax would be no greater than those
involved in implementing marginal cost pricing with a consumer
rebate, and they could be even less. The first two steps in the imple-
mentation process-calculation of allowed revenue requirements
and calculation of marginal cost-would be identical. The final step
of distributing the gains of regulation could be accomplished with
less administrative expense by using the existing income tax system
168. The tax should be calculated prospectively rather than retrospectively in order to
retain an incentive for efficiency analogous to that created by regulatory lag.
169. The precise form in which the proceeds of the excess profits tax are returned to
the economy is not relevant to the efficient allocation of resources. On equity grounds, how-
ever, it is at least arguable that part of the proceeds should be distributed in the form of
increased welfare benefits because welfare recipients would receive none of the gains of regula-
tion if they were distributed exclusively through income tax reductions. The present regula-
tory system returns some of the gains of regulation to welfare recipients in their capacity as
consumers of energy.
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than by establishing a separate mechanism for allocating and dis-
tributing consumer rebates. Thus, it follows that marginal cost pric-
ing with an excess profits tax would produce a net reduction in the
transaction costs of regulating the natural gas industry. The re-
duced transaction costs resulting from the elimination of the need
for administering a curtailment system and from the ability to limit
the inquiry in new gas supply project proceedings to externality
issues should far exceed the additional transaction costs introduced
in the rate-setting process.
If this method of adopting marginal cost pricing has a unique
disadvantage, it is the possibility that some may view the distribu-
tion of the gains from regulating the gas industry to taxpayers,
rather than to gas consumers, as inequitable. That gas consumers
have a unique equitable claim to the gains from regulating the gas
industry is not at all clear. A properly structured consumer rebate
system over time also would distribute the gains of regulation to a
group that is not identical to the group of people receiving gas ser-
vice at the time the rebate is made. Whether legislators will balk
at this characteristic of marginal cost pricing with an excess profits
tax is a topic on which only speculation is possible at the present.
As discussed in the next section of this Article, dealing with "second
best" problems, it is possible to turn this arguable disadvantage of
marginal cost pricing with an excess profits tax into an advantage
by broadening the scope of the proposed pricing reform to include
all fuels subject to rate regulation.
C. Constraints on the Implementation of Marginal Cost Pricing
(1) Second Best Problems
The phenomena referred to as second best problems are a tradi-
tional impediment to many utility rate reform measures that at-
tempt to improve allocative efficiencies through adoption of new
methods of pricing the product of one industry.Y7 0 If the pricing
structure of one industry is modified to permit a more accurate
reflection of that industry's costs, while the prices of a competing
industry's products continue to be determined through the opera-
tion of a regulatory system that does not require prices to reflect
marginal costs, it is at least theoretically possible that the improve-
ment in the methods of pricing the first industry's products actually
will produce a less efficient allocation of resources.
Illustration of second best problems in the context of marginal
170. See 1 A. KAHN, supra note 20, at 195-98.
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cost pricing of natural gas is accomplished best through a simple
hypothetical. Assume that a gas utility can provide service to a new
home in a town at an average cost of $2.00 per MCF and a marginal
cost of $3.00 per MCF. In this situation, the proper concern is that
the new homeowner will choose to install gas heat in his home rather
than an alternate heating system that might provide equivalent
heat at a cost of $2.50 per MCF equivalent. Because the cost of gas
that the consumer confronts is less than the cost to society of mak-
ing gas available to him, and because the real cost of a unit of gas
exceeds the cost of alternate sources of heat, the understated cost
of gas normally would misallocate resources. Forcing the price of gas
to increase to reflect the marginal cost of gas would increase the
efficiency with which society's resources are allocated.
Assuming, however, that the alternate heating source available
for new homes in the town is electricity, and assuming further that
the marginal cost of producing electricity for use in the town is $3.50
per MCF equivalent and that the $2.50 rate at which electricity can
be purchased in the town is a product of another regulatory scheme
that causes prices to be set at less than marginal cost, a change to
marginal cost pricing of natural gas may reduce allocative effi-
ciency. Before the change in methods of setting gas rates, a con-
sumer's choice of gas over electricity minimized costs to society
because electricity costs society $0.50 per unit more to provide than
natural gas costs. The understated price of both gas and electricity
would produce overconsumption of both, but at least the choice
between the fuels produced an efficient allocation of resources. If
marginal cost pricing is adopted for the natural gas utility serving
the town, but not for the electric utility serving the town, the con-
sumer will confront a price for gas of $3.00 and a price for electricity
of $2.50. The consumer will choose electricity over gas although the
equivalent quantity of electricity costs society $0.50 per unit more
to produce.
Second best problems can arise if marginal cost pricing is
adopted in the natural gas industry and competing fuels remain
subject to methods of rate regulation that produce prices below
marginal cost. The two energy sources that presently compete most
frequently with natural gas are subject to rate regulation methods
that tend to produce a price less than marginal cost. Rate regulation
methods analogous to those used in the natural gas industry price
electricity below marginal cost,17' while the entitlements program
171. The traditional method of setting electric utility rates is almost precisely the same
as the traditional method of setting gas utility rates. In the case of electric rates, the rate
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combined with restraints on the price that can be charged for some
domestic crude oil probably produce prices for petroleum products
that are less than marginal cost. 7 2
The second best problem has at least two partial answers and
one complete answer. Beginning with the partial answers, although
two of the products that compete with natural gas are priced on a
basis other than marginal cost, a great many other complete or
partial substitutes are sold in competitive markets not subject to
rate regulation. To assume that the prices for these products are
based upon marginal cost is reasonable. 73 For instance, coal is an
obvious potential substitute for natural gas in some applications,",
and most of the countless products that can decrease consumption
of gas, such as insulation, storm windows, and even sweaters, must
be considered potential substitutes for natural gas at the margin.
Even if adoption of marginal cost pricing of natural gas distorts the
allocation of society's resources from one fuel producing activity to
another to some extent, the overall efficiency of resource allocation
still could be improved by optimizing the allocation of resources
between substitutes such as natural gas and coal, and natural gas
and insulation.
Continuing with the second partial response, the potential for
misallocation of resources from one fuel producing activity to an-
other probably would be slight if natural gas prices were set at
marginal cost and electricity and fuel oil continued to be priced at
something less than marginal cost. Apparently, the difference be-
based upon average costs may be less than the marginal cost of electricity because of the large
increases in the capital cost of adding new generating capacity that have been experienced
in recent years due to inflation. See generally Aman & Howard, supra note 14; Cudahy &
Malko, supra note 110.
172. The present method of regulating the oil industry imposes ceilings on the price that
can be charged for old oil produced from domestic sources. It also contains a system of
"entitlements" to the old oil that produces an averaging effect on the costs that domestic
refiners must incur to obtain crude oil. Although most refined petroleum products are no
longer subject to price controls, the continued control of the price paid for old oil from
domestic sources and the entitlements program change the shape of the industry supply curve
in a manner that almost certainly results in some deviation between marginal cost and price.
See FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION REGULATION 12-18, 73 (P. MacAvoy ed. 1977).
173. A condition precedent to equilibrium in a competitive market is that price equals
marginal cost. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 455 (10th ed. 1976); G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF
PmcE 176 (3d ed. 1966).
174. The price paid for coal may not reflect current marginal cost in many cases because
coal is often sold under long-term fixed price contracts. It has been suggested that this
divergence of coal prices from marginal cost may create second best problems if marginal cost
principles are used to calculate gas rates. RATE DESIGN, supra note 15, ch. 8, at 9. This
contention appears fundamentally flawed because second best problems arise in the context
of substitution decisions, and substitution is not possible for a consumer purchasing coal
under a long-term requirements contract without violating the contract.
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tween the marginal cost of gas and the regulated rate that consum-
ers confront is significantly greater than the difference between the
marginal cost of electricity and petroleum products and the prices
the consumers must pay for those fuels.'75 Thus, the hypothetical
situation used to illustrate the potential for second best problems
in fact would exist only rarely, and the misallocation of resources
resulting from its occasional occurrence would be insignificant in
most cases.'78
The complete response to the second best problem is that sec-
ond best problems should be solved by changing the price-setting
mechanism in the electricity and petroleum industries to one that
reflects marginal cost principles, not by refraining from changing
the inefficient price-setting mechanism in the gas market. Indeed,
already a strong movement toward marginal cost pricing exists in
the electric utility industry'77 and the oil industry,'78 which indicates
175. In the case of electricity, a rate based upon average cost will be less than marginal
cost only if, and to the extent that, inflation in the cost of installing generating capacity is
not offset by changes in technology that reduce the operating cost of new generating capacity.
As a result, some electric utilities have marginal costs that exceed their rates while others
have rates in excess of marginal cost, depending upon the precise generating capacity mix
that each has installed in the past and plans to install in the future. Sometimes the increases
in new generating capacity costs almost precisely are cancelled out by decreased operating
costs resulting from technological changes. For instance, in the landmark case in which
marginal cost pricing principles were first applied in the calculation of electric utility rates,
the revenues resulting from average cost rates and marginal cost rates were found to be
"approximately equal." Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 5 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 28,37 (Wis. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1974).
In the case of petroleum products, price is likely to be somewhat less than marginal cost
because a portion of the supply of oil produced domestically is subject to federal price con-
trols, and the entitlements program spreads this inframarginal cost production to all refiners,
thereby modifying each refiner's cost curve. The effect of this price-controlled old oil on the
price charged for petroleum products, however, is small and decreasing for several reasons.
First, most petroleum products are no longer subject to price controls; consequently no damp-
ening of price results from controls at the second and third levels of distribution as exists in
the natural gas industry. Second, price controls obviously do not apply to foreign crude oil,
and foreign crude accounts for a significant portion of the total crude supply available to
United States refiners. Third, price controls apply only to a small and diminishing percent
of the supply of crude available from domestic sources. Fourth, petroleum products refined
overseas and imported into the United States are not subject to price controls, and therefore
are available only at prices based upon marginal cost. See generally FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINIS-
TRATION REGULATION, supra note 172. See also Kahn, supra note 150, at 24.
176. A second best problem resulting from setting natural gas prices at marginal cost
without a similar change in oil and electricity prices can occur only in those instances in which
the marginal cost of natural gas is higher than the price at which the competing fuel is sold,
but lower than the marginal cost of the competing fuel. Thus, the probability that this set of
facts exists in a given situation (and hence, the number of situations in which it will exist) is
a direct function of the spread between the marginal cost and the price of the competing fuel.
Because this spread is relatively small in the case of electricity and coal, particularly in
relation to the very large spread for natural gas, only occasional and minor second best
problems can be predicted even if marginal cost pricing is implemented solely for natural gas.
177. Marginal cost pricing already has been implemented on some electric utility sys-
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the products of those industries are likely to be priced on the basis
of marginal cost long before comparable reforms of gas pricing
mechanisms can be implemented. This suggests that second best
problems may dictate a rapid move toward marginal cost pricing of
natural gas,' 7' rather than inhibiting such a reform.
One approach to eliminating second best problems could also
eliminate the concern about the arguable inequities of the marginal
cost with excess profits tax method of pricing natural gas. The prices
charged for all energy sources subject to price regulation'" could be
set using the same approach of calculating allowed revenues, setting
prices based on marginal cost, and taking the difference from the
supplier through a tax. With such a uniform approach to imple-
menting marginal cost pricing of fuels, the group from which the
gains of regulation are taken (direct and indirect consumers of all
energy sources subject to economic regulation) and the group to
whom the gains of regulation are distributed (taxpayers) would be
virtually identical. 8'
(2) The Relationship Between Marginal Cost Pricing and
Regulation of Producer Prices
The marginal cost pricing methods discussed above are entirely
tems in Wisconsin and New York. See Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 5 PUB. U. REP. 4th (PUR)
28 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974); Kahn, supra note 150, at 24. Several other states have
initiated generic rate design proceedings to consider implementation of marginal cost pricing
on all electric utility systems in the state. See Aman & Howard, supra note 15, at 1088 n.8.
See also ELECTRICAL WEEK, Oct. 11, 1976, at 7. Marginal cost pricing may be adopted quite
rapidly in the electric utility industry now that the utilities and state regulatory agencies have
had an opportunity to study its impact. There are strong indications that marginal cost
pricing of electricity will aid both utilities and the agencies that regulate them by increasing
utility earnings stability and reducing the frequency with which rate increases must be
sought. See Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Process
of Public Utility Price Regulation, 17 J.L. & EcoN. 291, 317-20 (1974).
178. Full marginal cost priing of petroleum products is likely to occur as a result of
either: (1) passage of the crude oil equalization tax proposed by President Carter in the
National Energy Act on April 29, 1977 (see 207 ENERGY MNGM'T (CCH), No. 204, pt. 4, § 1401
(May 4, 1977)); or (2) deregulation of domestic crude oil prices. The present mandatory
controls of crude oil prices become discretionary in June 1979, and the discretionary authority
expires in September 1981. 15 U.S.C. § 760g (1976).
179. If petroleum products and electricity are sold at prices that reflect marginal cost,
and natural gas continues to be sold under a rate regulation scheme that produces gas prices
significantly below marginal cost, the potential for consumers to select gas over oil or electric-
ity when gas actually costs society more to produce is apparent.
180. Fuels that are not subject to rate regulation and that are sold in a competitive
market in equilibrium will be priced at marginal cost without any governmental intervention.
See generally P. SAMUELSON, supra note 173; G. STIGLER, supra note 173.
181. On equitable grounds, a portion of the gains of regulation should be distributed
through the welfare system because a significant segment of the public must pay for energy,
but would receive no benefits from a tax reduction.
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consistent with retention of controls on the prices that natural gas
producers can charge for old gas produced at inframarginal costs.
Indeed, all three methods were designed in part to respond to that
constraint. It is not at all clear, however, that any form of marginal
cost pricing could perform effectively consistent with maintenance
of regulatory constraints on the price at which new gas supplies can
be sold. The gas market probably would not clear without deregula-
tion of new supplies, and retention of price controls on domestic
producers certainly would produce a misallocation of resources from
domestic production to de facto unregulated production activities
associated with natural gas imports and synthetic gas manufacture.
The producer rate regulation scheme originally proposed by
President Carter illustrates these phenomena. Under that proposal,
domestic gas producers could obtain a maximum of approximately
$1.75 per MCF for new gas.' 82 The regulatory authority, however,
would continue to have no effective means of controlling the prices
that could be charged United States companies for gas produced
abroad and imported into the United States either by pipeline or in
the form of LNG. Moreover, regulators would have very limited
control over the prices that must be paid for gas manufactured from
coal.'83 The $1.75 per MCF ceiling on the price of new gas from
domestic sources would eliminate any possibility that the gas mar-
ket would clear solely because of purchases of new domestic gas
supplies by pipelines and distributors. Producers simply would not
produce supplies with a marginal cost greater than $1.75 per MCF,
and a consumer price based on $1.75 per MCF energy costs almost
certainly would produce excess demand whether the price is calcu-
lated using average cost or marginal cost principles. The only con-
ceivable way that the gas market could clear with this kind of con-
straint on domestic producer prices and on domestic gas production
would be through the acquisition of supplies that are not subject to
price ceilings (for example, imported LNG). But it appears that
supplies from sources of this type will be available only at prices
somewhere between $4.00 and $6.00 per MCF.
The net result expressed graphically is a marginal cost curve
with an enormous discontinuity covering the $1.75 to $4.00 per MCF
range. If the demand curve ordinarily would intersect the marginal
cost curve somewhere in this wide range, which it probably would,
the market would not clear. No pipeline or distributor would buy
182. H.R. 8444, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 404, 123 CONG. REC. 8265, 8310, 8313 (daily ed.
Aug. 2, 1977).
183. The price of the coal used to manufacture synthetic gas would largely determine
the price at which such synthetic gas is sold. Coal is not subject to rate regulation.
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gas at a price above $4.00 per MCF because it would lose too many
customers. With the market unable to clear through the price mech-
anism, administrative allocation (curtailment) would remain neces-
sary, and the interaction of marginal cost pricing and curtailment
would impair the effectiveness of any marginal cost pricing scheme
in achieving the goal of enhanced allocative efficiency. If the de-
mand curve intersects the marginal cost curve somewhere to the
right of the discontinuity, the market would clear, but only through
the incurrence of greater costs than would be necessary if producer
prices were unconstrained. Supplies of imported LNG that are only
available at a marginal cost to the pipeline of $4.00 to $6.00 per
MCF would be purchased instead of new domestic gas supplies that
could be produced at marginal costs in the $1.75 to $4.00 per MCF
range.
Thus, the effectiveness of any form of marginal cost pricing of
gas at the wholesale and retail level in enhancing allocative effi-
ciency depends in large part upon the willingness to remove the
regulatory constraints now imposed on the price that domestic prod-
ucers can charge for new gas supplies. Fortunately, because most
authorities agree that the gas production industry is structurally
competitive' and that market forces brought to bear by marginal
cost pricing could be expected to eliminate concerns that pipelines
will not shop and bargain hard for new gas supplies, the adoption
of some form of marginal cost pricing at the wholesale and retail
level should eliminate any potential justification for retaining price
controls on new gas production.
(3) Lingering Problems in Financing Major Gas Supply Projects
Essentially, two approaches can be taken to the interrela-
tionship between rate design and financing of capital-intensive gas
supply projects, such as coal gasification projects and LNG import
proposals, which can produce gas only at high unit costs. One can
assume simply that all these projects should be encouraged, and a
pricing system be adopted to maximize the prospects for successful
financing independent of the economic merits or demerits of the
project as reflected in the decisions of potential consumers and
investors. The present system of pricing yields this result. It has
obvious disadvantages because it provides no mechanism for deter-
mining whether scarce capital should be invested in natural gas
supply projects or in other kinds of projects that may be capable of
alleviating at less cost the aggregate supply-demand imbalance in
184. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
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the energy market. Nor does it provide a mechanism for selecting
which of the many gas supply projects competing for the scarce
capital are most economically desirable.
Alternatively, one of the kinds of pricing systems proposed in
this Article can be adopted to permit the decision whether to begin
a project to depend upon the willingness of consumers and investors
to commit to participate in the project based upon their perception
of its costs, risks, and benefits. The obvious advantage of the second
approach is that it provides a market test of the desirability of
committing scarce resources to the project, rather than to other
means of meeting consumer needs. Consumers' and investors' eval-
uations of the costs, risks, and benefits associated with the project,
however, are critical to the success of this second method. If,
through regulation, some of the benefits associated with the projects
are withheld from the consumers and investors that are offered an
opportunity to participate in the project, some economically worth-
while projects will not begin because they are not financially viable.
One of the ways in which the financing decision can become
disassociated from the economic desirability of the project is
through the attachment of a threat of diversion of the project's
supply output. The only way to avoid this threat is to establish a
pricing system that will clear the market through the price mecha-
nism. Once consumers realize that the threat of diversion of supplies
through direct governmental intervention has been removed, they
can evaluate the complete package of advantages and disadvan-
tages associated with a proposed project. Thus, one of the prerequis-
ites to changing the method of rate design in the natural gas indus-
try is assurance that the combination of pricing methods used at all
levels, from production through retailing, will clear the market
without governmental intervention.
Potential investors in gas supply projects, like potential con-
sumers, also must be confronted with the full costs, benefits, and
risks of a project if the market test is to yield reliable results. Essen-
tially, this requires a decision to leave free from regulatory con-
straints the price that can be obtained for the output of a new gas
supply project of any variety, including coal gasification plants and
LNG import projects.' 8 This necessarily follows from the nature of
185. The portions of the project that must be left free of economic regulation are those
in which substantial capital investments must be placed at risk. In most situations, this
would consist only of the production or manufacture of the gas and, in the case of LNG, the
cryogenic transportation and handling facilities. Occasional situations may exist in which the
transportation of a new gas supply by pipeline is such a capital-intensive, high-risk venture
that a market test of the economic viability of the project requires deregulation of even the
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the market test that is being relied upon to achieve the economically
desirable result. An example may help to illustrate the point. As-
sume that an investor has a choice between two projects with identi-
cal characteristics except that one project is subject to maximum
rate regulation and the other is not. The first project is a coal mine;
the second is a coal gasification plant. Both are high capital invest-
ment projects with long-term returns, and in both cases, periods will
occur in which uncontrollable factors, such as an unusually warm
winter, will depress demand for the output of the project to the point
at which the entire output cannot be sold at a price equal to cost.
In both cases periods also will occur in which factors, such as an
unusually cold winter, will cause demand for the output of the pro-
ject to increase to the extent that the entire output can be sold at
prices in excess of cost. In this highly realistic situation, the project
whose output is subject to maximum rate regulation always will be
rejected in favor of the unregulated project although, from a societal
standpoint, the projects are comparable. This is because maximum
rate regulation removes the opportunity to sell at prices in excess
of costs during periods of high demand. This potential advantage is
inherent in the unregulated project, and the present value of ex-
pected excess profits can be balanced by the prospective investor
against the present value of expected losses incurred during periods
of low demand.
Fortunately, as in the case of producer prices for new gas sup-
plies, no economic justification exists for applying maximum rate
regulation principles to new nontraditional gas supply projects.186
Consequently, the need to keep these projects free of economic regu-
lation should not present an impediment to the adoption of more
rational wholesale and retail rate designs. Once the investor in a gas
supply project is permitted (and required) to consider all of the costs
and benefits of a project, he then can choose to negotiate with poten-
tial consumers to exchange some of those costs and benefits-by
pipeline transportation segment of the project. The proposed pipeline from Prudhoe Bay to
the lower 48 states costing over $10 billion is certainly such a venture. The alternatives to
deregulation of the pipeline transportation portion of such a project appear to be: (1) permit
the use of a tariff that imposes all risks of the project on the consumer; (2) authorize govern-
ment guarantees of the investment in the project; or (3) simply decide administratively that
the project will not go forward. See generally Brief of Department of Treasury, El Paso Alas.
Co., FPC No. CP 75-96 (Dec. 1976). See also Kahn, supra note 105, at 15. A market test of
the economic desirability of the project appears far preferable to any of the other three
options.
186. The present competitive structure of the natural gas production industry should
not be altered substantially by the introduction of nontraditional sources of gas supply, such
as LNG, SNG, and Alaskan gas. If anything, the competitive structure of the market should
be enhanced as additional sellers enter the market.
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signing a long-term fixed price contract with a take-or-pay clause.'"
In such a situation, of course, the need to permit the consumer to
retain the benefits of the bargain by removing the threat of curtail-
ment and the need to permit the investor to internalize all potential
benefits by removing maximum price constraints merge as elements
essential to a reliable market test of the project.
(4) Potential Effects on Pipeline and Distributor Earnings
Stability
In terms of optimizing efficient allocation of resources, earnings
stability is a matter of total indifference. ' A pricing system that
achieves an optimal allocation of resources also can produce wide
fluctuations in a company's rate of return from one year to another.
For two reasons, however, some attempt should be made to keep gas
pipeline's and distributor's rates of return within a relatively narrow
range from year to year. First, a utility's cost of capital is likely to
increase if earnings fluctuate widely. An investor does not view two
companies as equivalent risks simply because both have an average
rate of return of fifteen percent over a ten year period. If one com-
pany's earnings fluctuate from eight percent to twenty-two percent,
and the second company's earnings fall consistently in the thirteen
to seventeen percent range, the first company will be considered a
higher risk investment, and investors will insist on receiving a prem-
ium to invest in it. ' Second, gas utilities and the commissions that
187. Investors have indicated an unwillingness to assume many of the risks associated
with major new gas supply projects, and have insisted that gas purchasers assume much or
all of the risks of marketability, project noncompletion, and even interruption of gas supply.
See, e.g., Transwestern Coal Gasification Co., UTm. L. REP. (CCH) 11,669 (1975); Columbia
LNG Corp., 96 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 389 (1972). To the extent that purchasers of gas are
willing to accept these risks voluntarily (for instance as a quid pro quo for a fixed price
contract), the project can be considered to have passed a market test of its economic desirabil-
ity. In some cases, however, the project sponsors have indicated that investors will not put
funds at risk unless consumers are forced involuntarily through tariff provisions to accept
many of the risks usually assumed by investors. In such cases it is impossible to determine
whether investor reluctance to put funds at risk is a result of their perception that the risks
of the project are too great or that the rate of return allowed by the regulatory agency is too
low. Because risk and rate of return are directly interrelated, the impact of each cannot be
assessed independently. Deregulation of major gas supply projects would eliminate this prob-
lem by simultaneously removing artificial constraints on the investor's rate of return and
precluding the sponsor from shifting project risks involuntarily to consumers through tariff
provisions. Potential investors then would be confronted with the total risks and benefits of
the project, and their decision to invest or not would provide a reliable market test of a
project's economic desirability, at least absent proof of significant imperfections in the capital
market.
188. See Kahn, supra note 105, at 12.
189. E. SCHWARTZ, CORPORATION FINANCE 203 (1962); see R. JOHNSON, FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT 8-9 (4th ed. 1971).
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regulate them could be exposed to periodic expressions of public
outrage if company earnings are permitted to fluctuate widely over
time. The criticism that could be expected in the years of high
earnings is theoretically unjustified,'90 but widely held views can
present real problems whether or not the views have a good founda-
tion.
The effect that the three suggested variants on marginal cost
pricing would have upon gas utility earnings stability is unclear.
Because the unit rate resulting from any of the three rate designs
includes some elements of cost that are not variable in the very short
term, within a winter heating season for example, and the unit rate
necessarily is predicated upon a forecast of units sold during a par-
ticular time period, any variation between the forecast demand and
actual demand will produce a corresponding variation of actual rate
of return from theoretically allowed rate of return. Of course, these
uncontrollable fluctuations in earnings occur under the present
method of rate design;'"' consequently, the only potential cause for
concern would be an increase in earnings fluctuations because of the
new rate design. To determine the extent, if any, of the increase in
earnings fluctuations resulting from imposition of some form of mar-
ginal cost pricing would require considerably more analysis. Some
increase in earnings fluctuations, however, reasonably could be ex-
pected because of the increased sensitivity of volumes sold to short-
term changes in demand.'9 2
Any undesirable tendency toward decreased earnings stability
could be made tolerable through modest changes in the rate instru-
ments used to calculate maximum unit rates, or the amount of an
excess profits tax or consumer rebate if pricing systems using those
devices were implemented. Automatic and semi-automatic cost
pass-through devices, such as purchased gas adjustment clauses,
are available to stabilize earnings to some extent. Indeed, adoption
of marginal cost pricing would reduce the basis for concern that the
availability of purchased gas adjustment clauses may create an in-
centive for imprudent expenditures by utilities. The market-
induced potential for least cost purchasing that would result from
190. The periods in which the utility earns a rate of return higher than that theoretically
allowed by the regulatory commission should be offset by periods in which the earned rate of
return is less than the allowed rate of return.
191. For instance, the FPC's recent modification of the Seaboard cost allocation for-
mula to include 75% of capacity costs in the commodity component of a pipeline's rates has
resulted in earnings deterioration on pipeline systems that experience a greater than antici-
pated decrease in gas supply available for sale. See United Gas Pipe Line Co., U~m. L. REP.
(CCH) T 11,954, at 12,266-67 (1977).
192. See generally RATE DESIGN, supra note 15, ch. 9, at 1-11.
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marginal cost pricing might provide an effective substitute for regu-
latory lag as a source of incentive for efficiency. To the extent that
automatic pass-through devices fail to bring earnings fluctuations
within tolerable boundaries, some of the more innovative methods
of adjusting rates to keep rate of return within a predetermined zone
could be adopted.'93 In short, although marginal cost pricing may
increase the need to be responsive to utility earnings stability con-
siderations, the devices available under present regulatory proce-
dures should be adequate to respond to any perceived problems of
this kind.
(5) Potential Effects on Pipeline and Distributor Cost of Capital
Even if marginal cost pricing produces no decrease in gas utility
earnings stability, an increase in a utility's cost of capital can be
expected due to the real increased risks to which utilities are ex-
posed under marginal cost pricing. When marginal cost exceeds
average cost, one of the principal effects of marginal cost pricing is
to increase the utility's exposure to marketability risks. The invest-
ment community will perceive this increased risk, and the utility's
cost of capital will adjust accordingly. Higher allowed rates of return
to pipelines and distributors must be accepted as an inevitable con-
sequence of imposing marketability risks through marginal cost
pricing.
(6) Political and Institutional Constraints
The preceding discussion has focused on the theoretical advan-
193. The utility earnings stability problems resulting from the combination of regula-
tory lag and high inflation in recent years have produced suggestions for a variety of auto-
matic revenue adjustment devices. See Kendrick, Efficiency Incentives and Cost Factors in
Public Utility Automatic Revenue Adjustment Clauses, 6 BELU. J. ECON. 299 (1975); Latimer,
The Cost and Efficiency Revenue Adjustment Clause, 94 PuB. UTm. FORT. 19 (Aug. 15, 1974);
Renshaw, A Note on Cost aiid Efficiency Revenue Adjustment Clauses, 101 PuB. UTIL. Foirr.
37 (Jan. 5, 1978). The broadest form of revenue adjustment clause adopted to date permits
automatic adjustment of an electric utility's rates to reflect all changes in costs every three
months in order to assure that the utility's earned rate of return coincides with its allowed
rate of return. Public Serv. Co., 8 PUB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 113 (New Mex. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1975). But see United Gas Pipe Line Co., UTiL. L. REP. (CCH) 11,954 (1977) (rejecting a
variable volume adjustment clause proposed by a gas pipeline as a revenue stabilizing de-
vice).
Of course, the problem with all such rate adjustment clauses is that they eliminate
regulatory lag as a source of incentive for efficiency. Kahn, supra note 105, at 12-13. To the
extent that requiring natural gas pipelines and distributors to confront a significant market-
ability risk through marginal cost pricing creates independent incentives for efficiency,
greater use of automatic revenue adjustment clauses may be possible consistent with the goal
of inducing efficient performance by regulated utilities. If marginal cost pricing with an excess
profits tax is employed, the adjustment to revenues would have to be achieved through an
automatic modification of the amount of tax rather than through an allowed change in the
rates charged by the utility.
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tages and disadvantages of implementing in some manner marginal
cost pricing in the natural gas industry. To bring this discussion into
the context of the present regulatory scheme, political and institu-
tional constraints must be considered in two respects. First, mar-
ginal cost pricing must be imposed by someone. Second, the method
of implementation must assure that gas utility rates actually reflect
marginal costs. Even a federal statute mandating marginal cost
pricing would not assure its actual implementation by resistant
state regulatory authorities, given the potential for intentional or
inadvertent misdesignation of cost components.
Any viable attempt to implement marginal cost pricing in the
gas industry must include the following elements: (1) adoption of
marginal cost pricing required by federal statute on all gas utility
systems;"' (2) a reasonably uniform method of calculating marginal
cost applicable to all utility systems; (3) a major continuing role for
state authorities in economic regulation of the gas distribution in-
dustry; and (4) built-in incentives for state regulatory commissions
to calculate accurately both marginal cost and revenue require-
ments.
The first requirement simply reflects the political reality that
no state would be likely to perceive marginal cost pricing of natural
gas to be in its best interests as long as other states continue to
permit gas prices to be set based upon lower average costs."5 If one
state adopted marginal cost pricing and a neighboring state did not,
the state with marginal cost pricing would fear losing some of its
industrial base to the neighboring state. Moreover, pressure from
consumers interested principally in the nominal cost of utility serv-
ices and from regulated utilities interested in retaining the rela-
tively risk-free status inherent in average cost pricing probably will
have much greater impact upon most state legislators than concerns
194. Even if it is ultimately held that the Natural Gas Act empowers the FERC to
require adoption of some form of marginal cost pricing by gas distributors that receive gas
from interstate pipelines-a holding that would stretch the boundaries of federal jurisdiction
under the Act to their limits, see note 71 supra-the FERC could require only some form of
inclining block rate. Since the inclining block rate is the least effective means of rationalizing
consumption patterns at the retail level, see Part VI(B)(1) supra, a federal statute specifically
requiring marginal cost pricing combined with consumer rebates or an excess profits tax is
essential.
195. An argument can be made that it is in the best interest of any state to adopt
marginal cost pricing because the elimination of gas curtailment in the state as a result of
the adoption of marginal cost pricing eventually would make that state more attractive to
gas consumers than the neighboring states, notwithstanding its higher nominal gas rates. The
author, however, is not optimistic that most or any state commissions would perceive this
advantage in the face of outrage by consumers displeased with higher rates and regulated
utilities concerned with greater risks.
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about efficient allocation of resources. 9 ' Federal legislators, under
pressure from an administration and the international community
to reduce United States energy consumption and with little reason
to fear losing industries to neighboring jurisdictions, are much more
likely to find marginal cost pricing palatable. '
Similar considerations dictate assurance of a reasonably high
degree of uniformity in the method of calculating marginal cost
adopted by each regulatory agency through the establishment of
binding federal guidelines. Each state might perceive an advantage
in understating marginal cost in an effort to keep both consumers
and regulated utilities within the state happy. Thus, federal in-
volvement is essential, at least in mandating marginal cost pricing
and setting binding uniform accounting rules for calculating mar-
ginal cost.
On the other hand, both political reality and administrative
efficiency dictate retention of the state utility commission's domi-
nant role in the process of regulating gas distributor rates. Congress
would be unwilling to take from the states the power to determine
196. Professor Joskow has hypothesized that regulatory agencies "seek to minimize
conflict and criticism appearing as 'signals' from the economic and social environment in
which they operate, subject to binding legal and procedural constraints imposed by the
legislature and the courts." Joskow, supra note 177, at 297. If this description of regulatory
agencies as institutions is accurate-and it seems to be more realistic than the other behav-
ioral models suggested to date-state agencies regulating gas utilities will continue to use
average cost as the basis for gas utility rates because this course of action will minimize
friction between gas consumers and gas distributors. Of the potential sources of friction with
whom regulatory agencies must contend, only environmentalists would appear to have an
interest in encouraging marginal cost pricing of natural gas, and they have not yet surfaced
as a significant force in natural gas rate proceedings-perhaps because natural gas supply
projects are considered a less significant threat to environmental values than are electric
generating plants. As more gas supply projects with significant potential for environmental
degradation are proposed, environmental groups may become more active in natural gas rate
proceedings. The increase in proposals to build cryogenic receiving terminals for LNG, to
construct water-intensive coal gasification facilities, and to begin drilling in the Atlantic outer
continental shelf may cause environmental groups to become a more significant source of
friction in future natural gas rate cases.
197. The Carter Administration has emphasized that: "The pricing of oil and gas
should reflect the economic fact that the true value of a depleting resource is the cost of
replacing it." White House, The National Energy Plan, reprinted in 204 ENERGY MNGM'T
(CCH) No. 207, pt. 3 (May 4, 1977) (emphasis in original).
Fernand Spaak, head of the European Communities Commission's delegation to the
United States, is highly critical of the United States as the only nation in the world whose
consumers do not pay full world prices for oil and natural gas. According to Mr. Spaak, the
resulting excess consumption by United States consumers adversely affects global supply and
demand for energy. Speech to the District of Columbia Bar Association Ten Nation Confer-
ence on Energy Conservation (Feb. 23-24, 1978), reported in 238 EN. USERS REP. (BNA) 28
(Mar. 2, 1978). For a well-documented argument that United States energy policy violates
obligations imposed by international agreements to which the United States is a party, see
Murphy, The International Energy Program: An Assessment, 26 DE PAUL L. REv. 595 (1977).
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gas utility rates and allowed rate of return. Even if Congress were
willing to do so, the elaborate federal bureaucracy required to re-
place the state commissions would be incapable of accomplishing
this task as efficiently as state commissions. Thus, although the
federal government should establish uniform accounting methods
for calculating marginal cost, state utility commissions should re-
tain the function of determining allowable costs, estimating vol-
umes to calculate utility revenue requirements, and setting the util-
ity's allowed rate of return.
Finally, even with the federal government exercising some de-
gree of control over the calculation of marginal cost, the institu-
tional constraints affecting state utility commissions must be con-
sidered and accommodated within the new system for setting rates.
Utility commissions now must set unit rates and allowed rate of
return simultaneously, in a manner that will accommodate the con-
flicting interests of the consumer in obtaining the lowest nominal
rate and of the utility in obtaining the highest rate of return. If
commissions set rates too high, consumers will apply pressure to get
it reduced; if commissions set rates too low, utilities will apply
pressure to get it increased. This is the inherent conflict in the
interests of its two constituencies that causes state commissions
generally to come to the "right" decision. In its two most promising
forms, however, marginal cost pricing makes the calculation of the
nominal cost of gas to consumers and the allowed rate of return to
the utility independent of each other. Apparently, state commis-
sions could serve the interests of both its major constituencies by
understating marginal cost while allowing a rate of return greater
than the utility's cost of capital. This would have the undesirable
consequences of reducing the effectiveness of marginal cost pricing
and transferring wealth from consumers (or taxpayers) to distribu-
tors. The establishment of federal guidelines for calculating mar-
ginal cost is a partial response to the incentive to understate mar-
ginal cost, but it is not at all responsive to the incentive to overstate
allowed rate of return. A countervailing incentive for state commis-
sions to maximize the difference between a utility's allowed revenue
requirements and the gross revenues obtained from marginal cost
pricing must be incorporated into the system if the new rate design
is to achieve its goals.
In the case of marginal cost pricing with consumer rebates, the
institutional incentive to maximize the difference between allowed
revenue requirements and marginal cost revenues is built into the
system. A commission can take credit politically for the large rebate
received by each consumer. Therefore, maximizing the size of the
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rebate would be in its best interest. For marginal cost pricing with
an excess profits tax, the institutional incentive would be relatively
easy to create simply by permitting the state to receive all or a
substantial part of the proceeds of the excess profits tax. The state
government as a whole would have a strong incentive to maximize
the amount of the tax, and the state regulatory commission would
probably respond by institutionalizing the revenue-maximizing
goals of the state government. The regulatory agency could take
much of the credit politically for any reduction in other state taxes
resulting from the imposition of a high excess profits tax on utilities.
Through either mechanism, the incentive to maximize the differ-
ence between allowed revenue requirements and marginal cost reve-
nues would be sufficient to balance the counter-incentives to mini-
mize nominal costs to the consumer and maximize utility rate of
return. Consequently, a reasonably accurate calculation of marginal
cost and revenue requirements would emerge from the rate proceed-
ing.
VII. CONCLUSION
The preferred prescription for the seriously malfunctioning nat-
ural gas market that emerges from this analysis would require the
following three changes in the statutes and procedures now used to
regulate the natural gas industry.
First, at the retail or distributor level, marginal cost pricing
with an excess profits tax appears to offer the best opportunity to
improve allocative efficiency at tolerable costs. With adoption of
such a pricing system required by federal statute and uniformity of
accounting methodology assured through implementation of man-
datory federal guidelines for calculating marginal cost, state regula-
tory commissions would implement and administer this kind of
pricing system effectively and efficiently, assuming that the state
received the proceeds from the excess profits tax. The only other
modifications of present state commission policy that this change
in rate-setting methodology would require are somewhat greater
sensitivity to potential fluctuations in utility earnings and allow-
ance of slightly higher distributor rates of return. A major advantage
of the change, in terms of the state commission's obligations, would
be the elimination of the costly and frustrating task of overseeing
gas curtailments by distributors. In addition, state commissions
could limit their review of gas supply projects proposed by distribu-
tors to alleged costs and benefits external to the transaction. From
the broader societal viewpoint, the change would increase markedly
allocative efficiencies in the consumption of natural gas and would
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permit distributors to make better informed decisions to purchase
additional quantities of gas from pipeline sources or to develop their
own supplies of gas. Marginal cost pricing with consumer rebates is
not likely to be as effective as marginal cost pricing with an excess
profits tax because of the danger that the rebate system will not be
true to the critical principle that the rebate cannot be related in any
way to gas consumption, and because of the difficulties inherent in
educating gas consumers to ignore the rebate in calculating the cost
of gas service. Inclining block rates with a tailblock based on mar-
ginal cost is a poor third choice for adoption at the retail level.
Second, at the wholesale level, the three methods of reflecting
marginal cost in pipeline rates are about equally effective and effi-
cient. The different characteristics of the pipeline's market elimi-
nate the concerns that led to the relegation of marginal cost pricing
with a customer rebate and inclining block pricing to second and
third place for adoption on the retail level.'98 In fact, inclining block
pricing may provide the easiest method of incorporating marginal
cost principles at the pipeline level. The only other changes in fed-
eral regulatory procedure that the change to marginal cost pricing
would dictate are increased sensitivity to pipeline earnings stability
and some increase in the rates of return allowed to pipelines. The
resulting advantages to the federal regulatory commission would be
analogous to those described above as accruing to state commis-
sions. The heavy burden of administering the curtailment system
would be removed, and the process of reviewing gas supply projects
proposed by pipelines could be truncated greatly. Again, from a
societal point of view, resource allocation on both the consumption
and production side would be enhanced significantly at the same
time that the transaction costs of regulating the gas industry are
reduced.
Third, at the point of initial sale, or the producer level, contin-
ued imposition of price constraints on old inframarginal cost pro-
duction is desirable. Restraints on the price of gas from new wells
or from nontraditional sources of gas supply, however, almost cer-
tainly would render largely ineffective any effort to improve the
operation of the gas market through new methods of setting prices
at the wholesale and retail level. Because the natural gas production
industry is structurally competitive, the incentive for purchasers of
gas to shop and bargain for the cheapest gas supply available that
is created by the adoption of marginal cost pricing should remove
most of the basis for concern that deregulation of new gas supplies
198. See note 159 supra.
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will result in windfall profits to producers. To the extent that some
concern continues that producers will be able to earn excess rents
on new gas produced at inframarginal costs, an excess profits tax is
much preferable to direct restraints on prices as a means of elimi-
nating the potential for windfall profits.
